

Statements on the Shelling between two Koreas on November 23

The reality of the Northern Limited Line

By Jack Pritchard, the president of the Korea Economic Institute

January 15, 2011

Expert says NLL has been effective, practical maritime border for six decades

On Dec. 12, 2010, The New York Times published an opinion piece entitled “Drawing a Line in the Water.” It caused a commotion, in part because of its simplistic and inaccurate approach to a complex problem.

The thrust of Selig Harrison’s argument in his op-ed was that there was an inequality in the manner that the Northern Limit Line has established a maritime boundary that economically disadvantages North Korea. He says the way to stop North Korea from acting out is to change the line.

The solution, according to Harrison, is for the United States to unilaterally redraw the NLL, moving it slightly to the south. While Harrison does not suggest precisely where this new line would be, his premise is that if Pyongyang believed the new line were more equitable it would cease its provocative and dangerous behavior.

The idea that the United States, because of its leading role under a United Nations mandate during the Korean War, could redraw the North-South maritime boundary without South Korean input is like suggesting the United States could unilaterally respond militarily to North Korean violations of the armistice without listening to the South Korean people.

One of the more absurd statements in the Harrison piece is how he would enforce the newly redrawn maritime boundary. He says confidently that future North Korean provocations would result in swift retaliation by the joint forces of the United States and South Korea. The point is not where the line is, it is the violation that should provoke consequences.

Why then does Harrison not call for retaliation to recent North Korean violations of the existing line? What he has done is call for positive economic reinforcement to North Korean military aggression that killed 46 sailors in the sinking of the Cheonan and 4 South Koreans in the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.

In an even more bizarre suggestion, Harrison pulls from his past and invokes the name of North Korean retired general Ri Chan-bok as an authoritative voice of reason. Ri Chan-bok was the face of the North Korean military at the DMZ for forty years. He was never the North Korean military’s principal spokesman and in my own discussion with him, he never really appeared very knowledgeable of military matters.

He has since retired. But nonetheless, Harrison first suggests South Korea has no right to be involved with peace negotiations, but then because of the generosity of general Ri, the South could be part of a future trilateral peace regime. (Thank goodness North Korea has bestowed legitimacy on South Korea's participation in its own destiny.)

Enough of Harrison's lunacy

The reality is that the NLL has been in place since 1953, and while the North Koreans have never openly acknowledged it as the maritime boundary, it has practically functioned as one.

The fact that the line does not extend directly west from the land demarcation line has nothing to do with depriving North Korea of lucrative fishing areas, but everything to do with the protection of South Korean territory.

At the end of hostilities in 1953, South Korea controlled the five islands that are north of an imaginary westerly extension of the demarcation line. The only practical method of assuring the security of South Korean citizens on those islands and the territory itself was to draw an artificial line north of the islands equidistant between them and North Korea's coast, while assuring that North Korea maintained at least three nautical miles of territorial waters that was the international standard in 1953.

The alternative to a northern line that permitted South Korea uninhibited access to its territory (the five islands), would be isolated dots of South Korean territory in North Korean waters which would require obtaining North Korean approval for South Korean access. We have a recent example of how that model works: the Gaeseong Industrial Complex.

For political reasons, North Korea has, on multiple occasions, restricted South Korean access to Gaeseong and its citizens. It is important to remember that North Korea has not endorsed the Harrison shifting of the NLL, but rather has called for the abolishment of the line altogether and a direct westerly extension of the demarcation line that would prohibit South Korean military vessels altogether from the area and require South Korea to get permission for civilian resupply ships to reach the five islands. Why would the five islands fare any better than Gaeseong under this scenario?

Back to reality

The reality is that South Korean territory is north of an arbitrary extension of the demarcation line. Remember that a demarcation line is nothing more than an artificial line equidistant between opposing forces. That same theory should apply to the five islands in question.

The natural extension of the demarcation line should follow what is the NLL — whether it is “economically equitable” or not. The NLL has been the effective and practical

maritime boundary for nearly 60 years.

At a time when North Korea cooperatively sought to reduce tensions with South Korea, it agreed that “The South-North demarcation line and the areas for non-aggression shall be identical with the Military Demarcation Line provided in the Korean Armistice Agreement of 28 July 1953, and the areas that each side has exercised jurisdiction over until the present time.” (Article 11 of the 1991 Basic Agreement).

The spirit of the 1991 Basic Agreement and the reality of the effective line of separation should remain in force until the two Koreas mutually agree to change it.

The day the guns were silent

By Sunny Lee


December 22, 2010

BEIJING - North Korea's threat turned out to be a non-event - for the time being.

While that's the good news, people are scratching their heads as to why North Korea, which thrives on selectively implementing threats to build credibility, didn't proceed with its promise, yet it knew such non-action would potentially undermine its credibility for menace.

Pyongyang had pledged severe reaction to South Korea's insistence on Monday on going through with live-fire artillery drills off the same island that North Korea shelled on November 23.

For some analysts, the North Korean non-action was well within expectations. "It's international relations 101 in action," said



Daniel Pinkston, a Seoul-based analyst for the International Crisis Group. "North Korea did a cost-and-benefit analysis. North Korea said it was 'not worth it' to retaliate. That's the so-called 'rational deterrence' as shown in the college course of international relations 101."

"North Korea's non-retaliation was in a sense well expected," said Cai Jian, a security expert at Fudan University in Shanghai. "Pyongyang didn't want a war with the South. Its high-end threats, fundamentally, were to serve as a means to force the US to come back to the negotiation table by threatening the ally of the US."

Despite Pyongyang's repeated threats to retaliate South Korea's live-fire drill, the South went ahead on Monday afternoon. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, a hardliner,

was under pressure from his right-wing base for failing to respond more robustly both to last month's attack and the sinking of a warship in March.

The 94-minute operation included F-15K fighter-bombers shelling into seas claimed by the two rival Koreas. South Korea's marine artillery units on the island of Yeonpyeong began firing Monday at 2:30 pm and ended at 4:04 pm. Fighter-bombers patrolled the air and warships sailed in nearby waters ready to counter another North Korean attack.

For South Korea, going with the scheduled drill, despite the North's threat, was a matter of demonstrating its resolve not to be cowed by the North's belligerence and to exercise national sovereignty over the disputed maritime border. In a telling phrase of demonstrating national sovereignty, a South Korea's daily, JoongAng Ilbo, Tuesday ran an article titled "South Korea shot 1,800 rounds of national sovereignty for 94 minutes".

The two Koreas currently don't have military hotlines to manage crisis situations, a sign of how relations have been strained since Lee was sworn in early in 2008. For that matter, some observers worried that any miscalculations on either side might escalate to a major clash.

Yet, despite the absence of channels to read each other's intentions, Baek Seung-joo, an analyst at the state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses in Seoul, sees that South Korea's firm stance was somehow delivered to North Korea this time, which led North Korea to back down. "I think South Korea's message was conveyed to North Korea. That is, the South wouldn't tolerate the North's provocation anymore and its resolve to militarily respond to the North's military provocation," said Baek.

Some 20 American military personnel were on the island at that time of the drill, taking support and observer roles. This, according to Jang Sung-min, a former South Korean presidential aide for national security, who was in charge of the presidential Blue House Situation Room, served as a crucial deterrent. "My observation on North Korean behavior for many years is that North Korea doesn't meddle into a South Korean military drill when US arms servicemen also participate," said Jang.

"North Korea's strategy was to threaten the ally of the US so that the US would come to the negotiation table. But it also feared that the situation might become a major clash between North Korea and the US, in case US military personnel became casualties," said Jang.

Another angle analysts noted was the high popular support - over 90% based on some South Korean polls - for the government to stand up to North Korean provocations. Such backing is rare in South Korea. Even though the two Koreas are nemeses to each other, their previous status as one country, which was divided into two after World War II, is an important factor.

Close to a quarter of South Koreans are former residents of North Korea or have relatives in North Korea. For that matter, in South Korea's domestic politics on dealing with North

Korea has always been a difficult game for policy makers who rely on popular voting to retain their political positions. With shared ethnic affinity, usually the public tone toward the naughty Northern brother is ambiguously stated as to be "tough but not too tough". It was different this time.

"The South Koreans have really changed. The time has come now that if North Korea wants provocations, it should also think through its consequences," said Baek.

"In the past, North Korea mounted provocations with the premise that South Korea wouldn't be able to respond militarily [fearing tremendous economic damage in industrial South Korea]. But North Korea couldn't trust that premise any more when it saw that South Koreans were willing to go ahead with its planned military drills despite calls for restraint from China and Russia and even the United Nations," added Baek.

Albeit absent in many news reports, increased aircraft movements took place from Guam where the US has its air base. "North Korea must have gotten the message. You should show resolve," said Pinkston.

The presence of Bill Richardson in North Korea while the two Koreas exchanged "a war of words" prior to the drill was a factor that observers also noted. Yet analysts downplayed Richardson's visit. "Richardson is not a spokesperson of North Korea. Any important North Korean deal will have its significance when it is stated by the North Korean government itself," said Baek, adding the purpose of Richardson's invite was largely to use him as a "useful variable" to shift the degree of tension on the Korean Peninsula, as it sees fit.

Although the situation is contained for the time being, analysts believe North Korea won't be continuing with its "nice guy" game. Pak Tok-hun, North Korea's deputy [ambassador](#) to the UN bluntly told the South Korean daily, JoongAng Ilbo, in New York: "Did you see we said something and we didn't carry out later?"

On Tuesday, North Korean artillery continued to be ready to fire. South Korea's military remained on a high alert in response and the president held a national security council meeting with his aides.

Analysts believe North Korea's next move will play to its usual routine. That is, raise tensions, get the attention from the US, and prod them to return to the negotiating table. Observers widely believe North Korea will measure its next provocation timing depending on the diplomatic progress or lack of progress it is making with the US.

Redefining denuclearization in North Korea

By Siegfried S. Hecker

December 20, 2010

Article Highlights


- The extent and sophistication of North Korea's centrifuge program demonstrates how poorly export controls limit a determined proliferator. Its current cooperation with the likes of Iran and Burma raise the specter of Pyongyang operating an A.Q. Khan-style import-export proliferation network.
- Pyongyang would greatly increase the current nuclear threat if it expands HEU production at undisclosed sites, increases the size of its nuclear arsenal substantially, or conducts more tests to enhance its sophistication.
- Not only must the international community work to limit Pyongyang's nuclear buildup, but the United States must conduct a thorough review of its policies on Northeast Asia security.

When my Stanford University colleagues and I were taken to the construction site of a small, experimental light water reactor (LWR) and to a new centrifuge facility in North Korea on November 12, it marked my seventh visit to North Korea and my fourth to the Yongbyon nuclear complex. I was not surprised that Pyongyang finally admitted to having a uranium enrichment program; however, I was stunned by the size and sophistication of the 2,000 centrifuges in the cascade hall visible from the ultra-modern second-floor control room.

This advancement in Pyongyang's program raises troubling questions about how North Korea's program got this far and the nature of the threat it poses. Moreover, in the wake of the recent military altercations between the two Koreas, our findings highlight the necessity to carefully review what we know about the nation's nuclear program -- and what we don't know -- so that we can prevent a further nuclear buildup and forestall the potential export of fissile materials and technology.

The small, experimental LWR. We visited the LWR construction site adjacent to the existing 5 megawatt electric (MWe) gas-graphite reactor (see Figure 1). The chief engineer told us the target date for operations is 2012; the design is complete, but many of the details are still being refined. With that in mind, I was surprised by how little information he was able to give me about the design parameters and materials. Still, I was able to determine some of the basic parameters: The reinforced-concrete containment structure is taking shape in a 7.1-meter deep pit on a reinforced-concrete pad that measures roughly 25 by 28 meters. It is 22 meters in diameter, 0.9 meters thick, and about 1 meter high on its way to 40 meters when complete. The power level is a modest 100 MW-thermal (likely to deliver 25 to 30 MWe power). The pressure vessel will be fabricated off site with high-strength steel, possibly with a stainless steel liner, transported by rail and welded on site. All components will be manufactured indigenously. The reactor will require 4 tons of uranium oxide fuel, enriched to 3.5 percent, typical for LWRs. The chief engineer acknowledged that they expect to have difficulty fabricating the oxide fuel since it is different from the metal fuel used in the gas-graphite reactor. They had not yet decided whether to use stainless steel or zircaloy cladding, neither of which they have used before.

Figure 1



Based on these observations, Pyongyang has chosen what appears to be a logical approach to develop LWR reactors. The experimental reactor is small enough that all components may well be produced and assembled indigenously. As it was explained to us, once North Korea's engineers gain experience with the experimental reactor, they plan to build larger power reactors. The anticipated 2012 completion date, however, is unrealistic.

Pyongyang's desire for nuclear electricity with LWRs is likely genuine since it has pursued acquisition of LWRs since 1985, first from the Soviet Union, then from the United States, and now on its own. Though it is technically possible that the LWR will be used to produce bomb-grade plutonium, I consider it unlikely because North Korea's existing gas-graphite reactor is more suitable for the production of bomb materials than Pyongyang's LWR.

I am more concerned about reactor safety. From what little we saw, it also appears that construction practices are not commensurate with international reactor safety standards

and practices. The international reactor community has found that a strong, independent and well-informed regulatory agency is critical to assure safe construction and operations. It is unlikely that Pyongyang's nuclear regulatory body meets these requirements. Finally, LWRs represent a new technology for North Korea, designed by a new team of young engineers trained in North Korea, to an unrealistic time schedule -- all of which gives us reason to be concerned about safe reactor operations once it comes online.

The new centrifuge facility. From the second-floor control room, my colleagues and I could see into the high-bay hall, and our jaws dropped: Three rows of pairs of centrifuges extended 50 meters in both directions from the central observation deck. The modern control room had blinking LEDs and flat-panel monitors featuring numerous diagrams and flashing numbers. We were told that 2,000 centrifuges in six cascades were operating, producing low-enriched uranium (LEU) for the LWR under construction. We were hurried past the control room and through what they called the recovery room -- the product withdrawal area, which allowed us to see some of the gas handling systems and tanks. Because of the hurried pace and limited access, we are not certain that the centrifuges were operational, but what we saw was not inconsistent with a partially or fully operational facility.

In response to my questions, the chief process engineer told us the capacity is 8,000 kilograms separative work units (SWU) per year, consistent with the fuel requirements for the experimental LWR. This also implies that what we saw were second-generation or so-called P2 centrifuges. Upon further questioning, he said that the rotors were iron alloys (likely maraging steel), with one bellows, designed indigenously, but modeled after the European URENCO designs and Japanese designs at Rokkasho-mura. Our rough estimate from the second-floor observation window was that the outer dimensions of the centrifuges were roughly 20 centimeters in diameter by 1.8 meters tall. Their enrichment target, we were told, is 2.2 to 4 percent, with an average level of 3.5 percent and tails of 0.27 percent.

An operational facility requires the production of uranium tetrafluoride and uranium hexafluoride. Between 1994 and 2002, when plutonium operations were frozen as a result of the US-North Korean Agreed Framework, Yongbyon lost the ability to make uranium tetrafluoride because of excessive corrosion of the hydrofluorination equipment.

The process engineer told me that they re-established the capability by building a new anhydrous line to make uranium tetrafluoride, which in turn is fluorinated to produce uranium hexafluoride, the feed gas for centrifuges. Yongbyon had never admitted having made uranium hexafluoride previously because it is not required for gas-graphite reactor fuel. Yet, now they claim they have this capability on site; however I was not allowed to see it. Nevertheless, my hosts made the case that they have everything they need to run the centrifuge facility. We also know that North Korea has ample uranium ore deposits for a domestic reactor program.

How did North Korea get this far? In April 2009, following North Korea's third long-range rocket launch and the predictable UN condemnation that followed, Pyongyang

announced that it would build its own LWR and begin an enrichment program to fuel the reactor. At Yongbyon, we were told that construction of the centrifuge facility began in April 2009 and that it was completed days before we arrived. But what we saw in Yongbyon demonstrates without a doubt that Pyongyang has pursued enrichment for many years. It has taken Iran more than 20 years without as much to show for its effort. For 15 years Tehran pursued uranium enrichment clandestinely. Once the Natanz facility was exposed by an Iranian resistance group, Tehran justified continued development as necessary for its commercial nuclear power aspirations. Pyongyang also appears to have pursued enrichment clandestinely for a long time, and now it has voluntarily shown us its progress, also justifying its existence for its new LWR aspirations. In both cases, it appears that pursuit of uranium enrichment was primarily for military reasons, or at best for dual use.

There has been plenty of evidence of Pyongyang's uranium enrichment efforts over the years, but no smoking gun. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf claimed in his memoir that A.Q. Khan delivered 20 P1 and four P2 centrifuges to North Korea around the year 2000. In late 2001, the CIA reported to Congress that North Korea attempted to acquire "centrifuge related materials in large quantities to support a uranium enrichment program." The CIA's December 2002 public estimate stated that North Korea could produce two atomic bombs annually through uranium enrichment beginning in mid-decade. By 2007, the CIA had downgraded its assessment.

During my first trip in January 2004, I was shown Pyongyang's plutonium bomb fuel, and a Yongbyon official told my colleague that they had a uranium centrifuge program in the 1980s, but gave it up in favor of plutonium in the early 1990s once they demonstrated success in extracting plutonium in their reprocessing facility. This statement was later retracted with a staunch defense of no enrichment program and a denial of the US assertion that Pyongyang admitted a uranium enrichment program when US negotiators presented evidence of such a program.

In a comprehensive PDF October 2010 review of Pyongyang's enrichment program, David Albright and Paul Brannan, of the Institute for Science and International Security, conclude that North Korea's procurement history indicates that it "has moved beyond laboratory-scale work and has the capability to build, at the very least, a pilot-scale gas centrifuge plant," but doubted that the data indicated the construction of a 3,000-centrifuge plant, large enough for about two weapons per year. I was more skeptical and expected to find only an R&D level facility. Now that we have seen a 2,000-centrifuge smoking gun, we must re-analyze the data and dig deeper to see how they got this far.

In spite of Yongbyon's claims to the contrary, I do not believe North Korea can produce many key specialty materials and components for the enrichment facility indigenously. According to Albright and Brannan, North Korea has an extraordinarily far-reaching illicit international network through which it procures specialty materials such as high-strength aluminum, maraging steel, and specialty epoxy, along with components such as ring magnets, bearings, vacuum pumps, valves, and flow meters. I believe that North

Korean specialists built the centrifuges and successfully incorporated them into working cascades once they procured many of the requisite materials and components.

The extent of cooperation with A.Q. Khan prior to his 2004 house arrest in Pakistan is particularly troubling. Kahn not only supplied North Korea with a centrifuge starter kit, centrifuge controls, and software, but also trained some of the country's technical specialists at the Khan Research Laboratories. Combined with Pyongyang's own experience in the 1980s, the reciprocal visits of Khan's specialists to North Korea facilities may have provided the hands-on training and coaching that later allowed Pyongyang to master centrifuge operations in a relatively short time.

Although exposure and termination of Libya's enrichment program took A.Q. Khan out of the export business, it did not necessarily eradicate his network, which had transformed from a single-node import network to a more complex, multi-node export network. Pyongyang had also developed its own import nodes such as the Nam Chongang Trading Company, an arm of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy, which bought and sold a wide range of legitimate and illicit goods, including many with dual-use nuclear potential and which was recently sanctioned by the UN.


Recent reports by the Congressional Research Service and the UN Security Council Panel of Experts show how Pyongyang has been able to circumvent many of the sanctions imposed by UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. Pyongyang successfully uses intermediaries, such as China, in which many of its companies operate to procure dual-use equipment. It uses transshipment countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and the United Arab Emirates. Pyongyang also uses air and land routes through China with little risk of inspection. Recent increases in financial and business connections in China represent a particular vulnerability for dual-use transactions.

In a detailed analysis PDF of global proliferation networks, Chaim Braun and Christopher Chyba linked a centrifuge for missiles deal between Pakistan and North Korea to the resurgence of Pyongyang's centrifuge program in the 1990s. Close cooperation during the past few years between North Korea and Burma in missile technologies and possibly in nuclear technologies, along with long-standing cooperation with Iran open the possibility that Pyongyang is operating an A.Q. Khan-like proliferation network that has procurement, manufacturing, assembly, and transshipment nodes in countries with little transparency and suspected illegal commerce. Now that Pyongyang has apparently demonstrated its ability to acquire materials and components, as well as build and operate centrifuge facilities, it also greatly increases the risk of financially lucrative nuclear exports.

Why did Pyongyang show us these facilities? It wanted the world to know. We were credible messengers to verify that North Korea not only has uranium centrifuges, but they are modern and sophisticated. Pyongyang surely knows that its claim of having begun the program in 2009 is not credible, so by going public it may also be sending a not-so-subtle message that it has a second route to bomb fuel, namely the ability to produce HEU.

Although Pyongyang could have continued to hide its existing enrichment facilities, the announcement of its LWR program allowed it to justify having its own uranium enrichment program. Since UN sanctions prohibit nuclear assistance, even for ostensibly peaceful purposes, Pyongyang claims it has to do the enrichment itself. The centrifuge facility we saw will be able to produce about 2 tons of LEU per year, adequate for the small LWR. Although it also can be reconfigured to produce 30 to 40 kilograms of bomb-grade HEU fuel per year (sufficient for roughly one bomb), their willingness to show it to us and the obvious blue roof (see Figure 2) over the facility, which does nothing to hide it, suggests that it will indeed be used to produce reactor fuel.

Figure 2



Still, it is likely that Pyongyang has another undisclosed facility that may be dedicated to HEU production. The centrifuge cascades we saw, or some subset of them, were likely built and demonstrated at an undisclosed facility and then duplicated at Yongbyon once the building was renovated. The possibility that North Korea had previously produced HEU was raised when minute traces of HEU were found on samples of aluminum tubes and copies of Yongbyon production records that Pyongyang reluctantly gave the United States in 2008 as a goodwill verification gesture.

How does the revelation of uranium enrichment change the security risk? Pyongyang already had the bomb, but not much of a nuclear arsenal. A 25-year pursuit of the plutonium route to the bomb, interrupted by the Agreed Framework and some of the Six-Party agreements, yielded a plutonium inventory of only 24 to 42 kilograms, sufficient for four to eight bombs. Given its limited and less-than-successful nuclear test history, these are likely primitive, rather than miniaturized for missile delivery.

During my 2007 visit to Yongbyon, I was given unprecedented access to its plutonium facilities, which convinced me that Pyongyang was prepared to give up the plutonium production complex. Subsequent actions have confirmed it: The 5 MWe gas-graphite reactor is shut down, no plutonium is being produced, and there is no plutonium in the pipeline to be reprocessed. The fact that the metal fuel rod fabrication facility was gutted and turned into a centrifuge hall and the cooling tower has not been rebuilt will make future plutonium production more time-consuming. Pyongyang has also expressed renewed interest in selling its remaining fresh uranium metal fuel rods, which it requires to restart its reactor, to South Korea if the price is right.

Although I cannot claim that I understand Pyongyang's nuclear motivations, I can venture some observations based on my visits. Before the most recent visit, I believed that Pyongyang would settle for its handful of simple plutonium bombs for its deterrent. It would have to test again to miniaturize the bomb for missile delivery for a more potent deterrent. But it had a limited supply of plutonium and even if it restarted the reactor, it could produce only one bomb's worth per year. Pyongyang appeared ready to give up the plutonium complex for appropriate diplomatic and economic gains while keeping its nuclear weapons, which it has repeatedly said are necessary in what it views as today's hostile environment.

If Pyongyang now uses the new centrifuge facility to make one bomb's worth of HEU per year or augments it with another bomb per year in a similar undisclosed facility, it provides a hedge, but does not dramatically change the security calculus. If, for any reason, Pyongyang has difficulties with its plutonium bombs, it could easily turn to HEU for a simpler, more assured path to a primitive bomb -- one it may be able to field without nuclear testing. In terms of a miniaturized, missile-capable bomb, HEU has greater limitations than plutonium; and in either case, it would have to test again.

One risk of the now-disclosed uranium enrichment program is that Pyongyang will mount a stepwise campaign for large-scale HEU production. If North Korea is able to produce a much larger nuclear arsenal and conducts additional nuclear tests, it not only strengthens

its deterrent, but becomes a much greater security threat. The HEU route to missile-capable bombs may have some attraction for North Korea if it received the same warhead design that A.Q. Khan sold to Libya. It was an HEU implosion device, believed to be based on a tested Chinese device, which is small enough to fit on some of Pyongyang's missiles.

Whereas it appears likely that Pyongyang has a hidden centrifuge facility, one that may well be dedicated to HEU production, I consider large-scale HEU production unlikely at this time. North Korea cannot expand its centrifuge capacity at will, in my opinion, because they are still not able to produce most of the key materials and components indigenously. Thus, as Albright and Brannan pointed out, it is now imperative that the international community does more to shut down Pyongyang's continuing illicit nuclear procurements.

More troubling is the possibility that North Korea could begin to export fissile materials or the means of producing them. Prior export of uranium hexafluoride to Libya and Pyongyang's cooperation with Syria to build a plutonium production reactor give us reasons for concern. It has now expanded its export potential by demonstrating its ability to bring a modern centrifuge facility online. It may help Iran solve some of the difficulties it has experienced with its centrifuge program. Pyongyang's success demonstrates how difficult it is to stop centrifuge procurement activities and how difficult facilities are to find. Moreover, should Pyongyang produce large quantities of HEU, the threat of export of fissile materials, either by the state or factions within the state, increases substantially. The market for HEU may be much more lucrative than that for plutonium because it is easier to fashion into simple bombs and it is more difficult to detect in transport.

So, where do we go from here? Pyongyang can ratchet up the current nuclear threat if it greatly expands HEU production at undisclosed sites, increases the size of its nuclear arsenal substantially, or conducts more tests to enhance its sophistication. Increased centrifuge capacity also heightens the export threat. Hence, the immediate response by the international community should be to limit Pyongyang's nuclear buildup.

By unveiling the LWR and enrichment facility, Pyongyang has also complicated the diplomatic process by in effect redefining what is meant by denuclearization. Not only is it unlikely that Pyongyang will give up its nuclear arsenal anytime soon, but it will almost certainly insist on keeping its LWR program and centrifuges because the justification for its peaceful nature is more credible than for the plutonium program -- of course, no less problematic as the Iranian situation has demonstrated.

It is time for the United States to conduct a thorough review of its policies on Northeast Asia security. Much has happened in the past 10 years, yet the US government continues to view North Korea primarily through nuclear lenses, while Pyongyang sees normalization of political and economic relations as imperative. Whereas our Foreign Ministry host told us that Pyongyang continues to support denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as agreed to in the September 2005 Six-Party joint statement, he quickly added

that Washington could begin the normalization process by reaffirming part of the October 2000 US-DPRK joint communiqué, which stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both to make every effort to build a new relationship free from past enmity. In the meantime, we must take steps to prevent an expansion of North Korea's nuclear program and de-escalate the mounting tensions between the two Koreas. The fundamental and enduring goal as agreed to in the joint statement must be denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

However, since that will take time, we must quickly press for what I call the three no's: No more bombs, no better bombs (which means preventing further nuclear testing), and no export, in return for one yes -- our willingness to seriously address North Korea's fundamental insecurity. Based on our discussions with Pyongyang officials, we can begin to address North Korea's security concerns along the lines of the joint communiqué. The greatest current vulnerabilities in enforcement appear to be in China. Beijing has not been willing to tighten sanctions on Pyongyang to denuclearize now, but it may support the three no's and one yes policy as a necessary first step, one that it views consistent with its desire to preserve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. This approach may just be enough to get Beijing to take a much more aggressive stance to help shut down Pyongyang's nuclear import and export networks.

KPA Supreme Command: World Should Know Who Is Provoker
KCNA (Korean Central News Agency of DPRK)
December 20, 2010

Pyongyang, December 20 (KCNA) -- The Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army released the following communique Monday:

The U.S. imperialists and the south Korean puppet military warmongers perpetrated such reckless military provocation as firing thousands of bullets and shells from the sensitive area of Yonphyong Island in the West Sea of Korea for an hour from 14:30 Monday despite strong warning of the KPA and condemnation of the public at home and abroad, far from drawing a lesson from the disgraceful defeat they suffered in the last Yonphyong Island shelling.

Their military provocation was a product of their cunning scenario to deliberately lead the military counteraction of the DPRK to driving the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of a war and thus save the U.S. Asia policy and strategy toward the DPRK from bankruptcy.

It was, at the same time, to serve the propaganda purpose as it was aimed at saving the face of the present puppet authorities now finding themselves in such profound ruling crisis that it is hard for them to complete the tenure of their office because of their ignorance and incompetence and delivering the puppet military from its decline.

This was nothing but a childish play with fire of cowards without an equal as they made much fuss, firing shells left unused during the military provocation on November 23 after shifting by stealth the waters to be a scene of the projected shelling and its target for fear of the KPA's second and third retaliatory blows for self-defence.

The revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK did not feel any need to retaliate against every despicable military provocation like one taking revenge after facing a blow.

The second and third powerful retaliatory strike to be made by the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK knowing no limit as declared before the world will lead to blowing up the bases of the U.S. and south Korean puppet warmongers.

The world should properly know who is the true champion of peace and who is the real provocateur of a war.

US destructive role in Northeast Asia
Global Times
December 20, 2010

The protracted US backing of a vindictive South Korea has pushed the peninsula to the brink of war.

The reaction from the North, when faced with a live-fire artillery drill by South Korean forces on Yeonpyeong island, is predictable. Should the South proceed, a major military conflict cannot be ruled out.

This would spell out the worst scenario resulting from poor political judgment and lack of restraint from both sides. Apart from aimless bravado that may win plaudits from domestic supporters, there is nothing to gain for either side from a confrontation in which millions would suffer.

The US is thus not playing a responsible role. Despite its special envoy being sent to Pyongyang for dialogue, its support of these drills are only pushing North Korea to the edge.

While claiming to be standing guard for the South Korea, the US in fact will do the greatest harm to the South.

The escalation of the Korean crisis is bad news for China or Russia. However, tensions on the peninsula will provide the US, which is to blame for worsening intra-Korean relations, with a perfect excuse to "return to Asia."

It is time to take a closer look at the damaging power of the US role in Northeast Asia. At this critical moment of war and peace, Asian countries need to escape a Cold War mentality and maintain regional interests at heart.

US President Barack Obama has won a Nobel Peace Prize. If a second Korean war should break out during his second term in office, a war he did nothing to prevent, would his aura of peace be shattered?

No matter what China and the US do, the most important objective of all is for South Korea to keep a clear head. Should war break out, the biggest losses would be borne on the South. Despite support from the US and Japan, and sympathy from China and Russia, nobody would take those losses for South Korea. No matter what happens, it is impossible for South Korea to reunite the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea should also be mindful that a war will never fix the country's difficult straits. No matter how objectionable it may view negotiating and building a rapport with other countries, the North has to take this path.

As for China, it does not want to see any major crisis on the Korean Peninsula. But China is never going to bend to any challenge from outside. Should the troubled waters of the peninsula wet China's feet, somebody else may already be drowning.

A three-handed approach to Pyongyang


By Sung-Yoon Lee

December 18, 2010

The United States has called on its two allies in Northeast Asia for a trilateral response to North Korea's November 23 shelling of South Korea. Last week, top diplomats of the US, South Korea and Japan huddled together in Washington and pronounced "solidarity" among themselves and promised "consequences" for North Korea in the event of further provocations.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, on a visit to Seoul and Tokyo, even called for "trilateral action", meaning combined military exercises among the three nations.

Indeed, the three countries should counter North Korea's



choreographed cycle of aggression with a long-term, tripartite strategy of their own. However, beyond diplomatic rhetoric or politically sensitive military drills, the three nations should establish a Trilateral Task Force to put pressure on Pyongyang over time with the view toward seeking a peaceful, stable, single, free Korea - if only for the sake of gaining greater leverage vis-a-vis the Kim Jong-il regime in the short term.

Despite provocations ranging from small slights to major breaches and aggression, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo have never jointly meted out on North Korea any real punishment.

Pyongyang always keeps to its script. In fact, Pyongyang is the most improv-resistant actor on the world stage, seldom, if ever, deviating from its strategic playbook. Its plays include:

Minor insults like firing a missile off its eastern coast just hours before South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun's inauguration on February 25, 2003; inviting the New York Philharmonic to play in Pyongyang on February 26, 2008, the day after President Lee Myung-bak's inauguration just to steal the limelight from Seoul, and instigating a naval attack on June 29, 2002, the same day that South Korea was to play - on home ground - for an unprecedented third or fourth place in the football World Cup. But also bigger strategic offenses like firing a missile over Japan on Aug 31, 1998 (Sunday, to capture global headlines for the full week) and on April 5, 2009 (also Sunday), or the seven-rocket salute on July 4, 2006; conducting its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, on the eve of the North's communist party founding day, and a second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, US Memorial Day.

Such a thoughtful, proactive strategy of provocation warrants an equally serious, sustained, joint counter-strategy by the three democracies. The North Korea problem - nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, money laundering, counterfeiting, drugs trafficking, human-rights violations, attacks on South Korea - is a function of Pyongyang's strategy of survival. The Kim clan, beset by extreme economic stresses and facing an incomparably better competitor Korean nation across the border, cannot afford to abandon its essential tools of existence. In effect, North Korea presents a comprehensive problem to which a clear timeline for resolution is not readily applicable.

Hence, the task force should focus on the two most glaring contradictions in the North Korean system: first, the dependence on nuclear blackmail and illicit earnings as instruments of regime preservation in the face of a collapsed economy and, second, the unfeasibility of operating in perpetuity a prison camp nation through extreme repression and information blockade.

To this end, the task force should take up as a matter of priority the enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, especially the provisions prohibiting the transfer of material and financial resources in and out of North Korea that may be diverted to North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles programs.

The task force would establish a uniform, politics-proof standard of practice in this regard. It would support and strengthen US financial regulatory measures against North Korea's illicit activities already in place through intelligence sharing and joint operations. Curtailment of South Korea's transfer of hard currency into North Korea through suspect projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Park and Mount Kumgang tours - hostage magnets just waiting to happen - should take effect immediately.

Furthermore, the task force would highlight the acute North Korean humanitarian crisis through drawing world public attention to the issue and increasing support of radio broadcasts and other information operations into North Korea, as well as continued facilitation of North Koreans resettling in South Korea and the US.

The task force would sponsor, through third parties, reports, publications, international conventions, transmissions and dissemination of information related to North Korea's multifarious nefarious human-rights abuses throughout the United States, South Korea,

Japan and in European countries.

The more people in democratic societies think about the North Korean regime as a threat to humanity and less as an idiosyncratic abstraction, the more they will be resolved not to allow their leaders to resort to politically expedient measures with each future provocation or defer Korean reunification. For the South Korean leadership, breaking the taboo of potential economic costs of reunification should be a high priority.

For the task force to be effective, it must remain immune to North Korean protestations, provocations, or calls for negotiations, or the internal politics of the respective three nations, or spurts of bilateral issues of contention within the tripartite partnership.

It's time to acknowledge that while status quo maintenance in the Korean Peninsula has worked in deterring war over the past 57 years, it has all but failed in deterring North Korea's ever-growing strategy of brinkmanship. It is also time to accept that relying on China to resolve the North Korea problem has produced few returns over the past two decades. As Pyongyang presses ahead in 2011 on its proven path of provocation-for-compensation, Beijing will, as usual, counsel patience, exhorting Washington and Seoul to let bygones be bygones and embrace the future.

In early 2011, the Kim Jong-il regime will be particularly prone to flaunt its military achievements as it celebrates three red letter days in close succession: the birthdays of the crown prince on January 8, the reigning leader on February 16, and the dynastic founder on April 15. Rather than launch another direct attack on the South, the Kim regime will be more likely to exercise its "sovereign right" and conduct another weapons test. How will Pyongyang's three target nations respond to its next provocation?

The English poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge observed nearly 200 years ago, "If men could learn from history, what lessons it might teach us. But passion and party blind our eyes, and the light which experience gives us is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves behind us."

Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo must come together and at long last show Pyongyang that they, too, are able to draw lessons from history and even take measures - belatedly but resolutely - that carry consequences beyond righteous rhetoric.

Defending Korea Line Seen Contrary to Law by Kissinger Remains U.S. Policy
By Daniel Ten Kate and Peter S. Green
December 17, 2010

The sea border that has become the main battleground between North and South Korea 57 years after it was imposed by a U.S. general has been called legally indefensible by American officials for more than three decades.

Then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in a 1975 classified cable that the unilaterally drawn Northern Limit Line was “clearly contrary to international law.” Two years before, the American ambassador said in another cable that many nations would view South Korea and its U.S. ally as “in the wrong” if clashes occurred in disputed areas along the boundary.

The border was drawn by Army General Mark Clark and his aides in 1953 to stop South Korea from disrupting the fragile armistice he oversaw at the end of the Korean War, according to Narushige Michishita, an associate professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. Now, the U.S. must stand by the line to contain North Korea, said Michael J. Green, a security adviser to President George W. Bush.

Moving the boundary further from North Korea’s coast would make it easier for the regime “to smuggle out military equipment and drugs, and smuggle in things that are part of their nuke program,” said Green, who now heads the Japan Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “Nothing good comes from it.”

Green said the border was a “gray area” used to justify confrontations such as last month’s shelling of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island. The South is committed to defending the boundary, and in November last year fired on North Korean ships that crossed the line. South Korea blamed the North for torpedoing one of its warships, the Cheonan, near the disputed waters in March.

‘Uncontrolled Escalation’

The standoff sets the stage for further clashes that might draw the U.S., which is committed by treaty to defend the South. The stakes have been raised as Kim Jong Il’s regime has tested nuclear weapons and deployed hundreds of missiles and artillery pieces within reach of Seoul.

North Korea today warned the South to cancel an artillery drill on Yeonpyeong that may start as soon as tomorrow, and said its retaliation will be “deadlier” than last time, according to the official Korean Central News Agency. North Korea said it had urged South Korea before the Nov. 23 shelling not to go ahead with drills.

South Korea’s military pledged on Dec. 9 to “totally crush” the North in the event of a repeat of the barrage, which killed four people. About 20 U.S. military personnel will

take part in the exercise, a South Korean Defense Ministry official said, declining to be identified because of government policy.

“The situation is near a point where South Korea is going to strike out at North Korea, where we could see an uncontrolled escalation,” Army General Burwell B. Bell III, commander of U.S. forces in Korea from 2006 through 2008, said in an interview.

‘Test Alliance’

Bell said North Korean leaders want a treaty guaranteeing survival as an independent state and “will test the alliance between South Korea and the U.S. whenever they need concessions.” He agreed with Green that it wouldn’t be wise to renegotiate the border “in the hopes that North Korea will become benevolent.”

State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley referred questions about the current American view of the line’s justification to the U.S. military in South Korea. Colonel Jonathan Withington, a spokesman for the U.S.-led United Nations Command in Seoul, said the NLL should not be renegotiated.

‘Military Control’

“The Northern Limit Line is a military control measure in place to prevent armed conflict,” Withington, also a spokesman for the U.S. forces in South Korea, said in an e-mailed response when asked about North Korean incursions. “Any hostile acts, such as the North Korea sinking of the Cheonan and the attack on Yeonpyeong Island, which are both south of the NLL, are clearly serious violations of the armistice agreement.”

The line snakes around the Ongjin peninsula, creating a buffer for five island groups that South Korea kept under the armistice that ended the 1950-1953 Korean War, in which U.S.-led forces fought under a UN mandate against North Korean and Chinese troops. The agreement doesn’t mention a sea border, which isn’t on UN maps drawn up at the time.

The 3-nautical mile (3.5-statute mile) territorial limit used to devise the line was standard then. Today almost all countries, including both Koreas, use a 12-mile rule, and the islands are within 12 miles of the North Korean mainland. The furthest is about 100 miles (160 kilometers) from the closest major South Korean port at Incheon.

“If it ever went to arbitration, the decision would likely move the line further south,” said Mark J. Valencia, a maritime lawyer and senior research fellow with the National Bureau of Asian Research, who has written extensively on the dispute.

‘Lighted Fuse’

In June 1953, a month before the war ended, South Korean President Syngman Rhee -- described by Clark in his 1954 memoir “From the Danube to the Yalu” as “a lighted fuse

sputtering towards the powder barrel” -- said he wouldn’t cooperate with a truce, Central Intelligence Agency memos show. While the South wanted to fight on, Clark was under orders to find what President Dwight D. Eisenhower called an “honorable peace” as support for the war at home faded.

“There was concern over President Rhee and what he might do,” said Larry Niksch, a former Asian affairs specialist at the U.S. Congress’s research arm. “There was a lot of concern he might try to open hostilities again.”

So Clark and his aides drew the line to restrain Rhee and prevent clashes, said Michishita, author of the 2010 book “North Korea’s Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008.” “North Korea was not notified of the line,” he said.

Tested Border

North Korea, after spending two decades rebuilding its forces, sent vessels across the border 43 times between October and November 1973, sparking confrontations, according to the South Korean Navy’s website. At a meeting with the UN Command, the North’s claim that it was operating within its own waters because the NLL was invalid was rejected.

Kissinger and other U.S. diplomats privately raised questions about the legality of the sea border and South Korea’s policing of it in cables that have been declassified and are available to the public.

“The ROK and the U.S. might appear in the eyes of a significant number of other countries to be in the wrong” if an incident occurred in disputed areas, U.S. Ambassador Francis Underhill wrote in a Dec. 18, 1973, cable to Washington, using the acronym for Republic of Korea.

South Korea “is wrong in assuming we will join in attempt to impose NLL” on North Korea, said a Dec. 22, 1973, “Joint State-Defense Message” to the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.

‘Unilaterally Established’

The line “was unilaterally established and not accepted by NK,” Kissinger wrote in a confidential February 1975 cable. “Insofar as it purports unilaterally to divide international waters, it is clearly contrary to international law.”

Kissinger’s office did not respond to an e-mail and phone call seeking comment.

In the most recent confrontation, North Korea justified its Nov. 23 artillery bombardment as retaliation for South Korea firing shells into sea that the North claims as its own.

“Yeonpyeong is located deep inside the territorial waters” of North Korea, KCNA said in a Nov. 24 dispatch.

Two days later, President Barack Obama said the U.S. stood “shoulder to shoulder” with the South and condemned the “unprovoked” attack. The U.S. has about 28,500 troops in South Korea, which is still technically at war with the North.

South Korean President Lee Myung Bak said last week the islands will be turned into fortresses and reversed predecessor Roh Moo Hyun’s plan to reduce troop numbers there.

“South of the NLL is water under our jurisdiction,” Kim Min Seok, a Ministry of National Defense spokesman in Seoul, said last week. A 2009 statement on the ministry website says the line “is the practical maritime border that our military has protected for years. We will protect it without fail.”

A rational suggestion regarding North Korea

By John Hemmings at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, London

December 15, 2010

North Korea's artillery attack on its Southern neighbour was not – as it claimed- a justified reaction to a South Korean military exercise. Rather, it was only the latest in a series of pin-prick attacks designed to pressure and bully its southern neighbour.

This uniquely North Korean approach to diplomacy is a form of bullying that walks the Clausewitzian tightrope between politics and war. Not only does North Korea know exactly how far it can go before provoking a major response from South Korea or the United States, it knows that most of these attacks will go unpunished since they ultimately have Beijing's support.

Pyongyang also has three other cards up its sleeve: the nuclear trump card, the vulnerability of Seoul to North Korean artillery, and the threat of its own collapse and the impact this would have on the region. While some have interpreted the November 22nd attack as an attempt to bolster internal support for Kim Jong-il's son and heir Kim Jong-un, it is more likely that the attack was designed to apply pressure on Seoul and Washington and push them back into the Six Party Talks, the nuclear negotiations which have been frozen since December 2009.

Emboldened by tacit Chinese support after the sinking of the Cheonan, a South Korean Corvette, Kim Jong-il has calculated that another attack serves to remind the US and South Korea that he will not be ignored. Given the deliberate revelation – staged through a visiting American academic – that Pyongyang has developed an advanced facility for enriching uranium, it now appears as though South Korea and the US will be compelled to deal with the North.

China's not-so-subtle call for a resumption of the Six Party Talks is meant to reinforce this urgent need to reconnect. And yet, policy-makers in Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul should reconsider their greater strategy towards the rogue regime. And they should begin with a fresh slate, rather than revitalising the current strategy, which amounts to sustain the status quo until the North collapses.

They must ask themselves what decades of negotiations over North Korea's intention to develop nuclear weapons come to. Certainly they have done little to stop the regime from doing just that. Furthermore, it has not stopped the North from carrying out a series of pin-prick attacks on the South in an increasingly belicose manner, nor from preparing to test another nuclear device, nor from developing and test-firing a growing range of missile systems. The driving force behind a new policy on North Korea should be one that makes an ultimate difference to the current unsatisfactory status quo.

This policy should relieve the hundreds of millions living in Japan and South Korea from North Korean bellicosity and aggression. More importantly, it should also be one that ultimately frees the 23 million North Koreans from what must be one of the most

oppressive and morally repugnant regimes in existence. While Blair-style interventionism is considered dead and buried, it would be the greatest mistake to forget the moral imperative in designing public policy, replacing it instead with an unsatisfactory blend of self-interest and international competition.

1. The following points should be considered (and, the author believes, debated): North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons. They guarantee attention, a flow of aid, and a status far above North Korea's size.
2. The North Korean regime is trying to perpetuate the current regime it has with a new heir (such that the status quo is set to be extended a further 50-60 years).
3. While North Korea is economically bankrupt, China will continue to support it indefinitely for strategic and national interests.

If all three points are considered true, then it follows that the current status quo, with all its misery and uncertainty, could last indefinitely. Therefore, it stands to reason to say that the current policy is not only misguided, but simply wrong, and serves the opposite purpose than intended. If this is true and a new policy is to be built, then perhaps the following three principles should be examined.

1. If all nuclear negotiations with North Korea have been used to secure aid and perpetuate the regime, but have not stopped the North from getting nuclear weapons, then all negotiations should be abandoned since they are ultimately more useful to North Korea than to other states.
2. If it is possible that the current policy of engagement has only served to boost the regime and allow it to perpetuate itself, then the opposite must be tried. All links, diplomatic or otherwise, should be severed and the regime should be shunned completely. This should include a total economic block for many decades. It should be monitored and any efforts to proliferate weapons should be stopped.
3. China must bear the price of supporting North Korea completely, both economically and politically. China has played a double game regarding the North for two decades, allowing its ally to develop nuclear weapons and maintain a sizable military threat to the region and it must accept the full consequences of that choice.

There are some who would argue that such a policy would cause North Korea's collapse, but that overlooks China's unwilling commitment to the rogue regime. On the other hand, such a policy would put the onus to seek change on China, rather than on the United States. Up until now, China has benefited from the process without paying a full price. There are others who argue that sanctions regimes of this kind have been tried before with Iraq and fail for two reasons:

1. They punish the populations more than the elites of those countries

2. They are not effective and most regimes can outlast the will power of the international community.

Both of these arguments are strong ones, and the first is particularly salient for a policy that claims a moral imperative. The main response to this argument is of course the simplest: it is arguable that though the collapse of North Korea would cause untold misery to millions of North Korea civilians, it would ultimately be a finite misery: one that would eventually abate. On the other hand, if Kim Jong-un were to continue blithely down the same torturous route as his father for an additional 50-60 years, it is likely that this would also cause untold misery to millions.

Furthermore, many million lives would continue to be threatened by the nuclear instability of an erratic regime. Regarding the second counter-argument, this is simply untrue. No sanctions regime has ever been tried to the point of success. In Iraq's case, its control of a large portion of the world's supply of oil meant that sanctions would be under attack from without as well as from within. Iran shares this feature. North Korea, on the other hand, has no similar resource that other states require. The weakest link in this policy suggestion is public will in the face of the obvious misery that complete sanctions would cause the people of North Korea. But are we cruel enough to allow them to live another generation under the current conditions? Only time will tell.

ROK Government Should Strengthen Crisis Management System, Not Military Might

PSPD (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy)

December 13, 2010

- Stop the blaming of the previous governments for the current failure of managing crisis
- Stop unrealistic, military retaliation plans to avoid military escalation
- Stop closed-doors decisions and unilateral North policy that make people more insecure
-

Unprecedented war clouds are hanging over Korea. Following a ROK-US joint military exercise that ended today(Dec 1), the ROK government announced the start of shooting exercises at all seas. This comes immediately after the announcement of a higher increase in the military budget for next year, and concentration of fire power at the troubled war. Also in review is change of the code of engagement towards immediate and non-proportional retaliation. With regard to these worrisome developments and the recent Presidential public statement on the crisis, PSPD (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) appeals the following.

On November 29th, President Lee Myong-bak said in his public statement, "It is a historical lesson that 'humiliating peace' made by intimidation will eventually lead to a worse consequence. Those who defended North Korean regime so far should have seen the real nature of that regime by now... I will make it sure that North Korea will pay the cost for its provocation." What he brings about by his hard-line stance of "time for an action that is more worthy than thousand words" is not dissolution of people's insecurity, but greater worry and tension.

In the public statement President Lee blamed previous governments, which pursued engagement policies towards the North, for the current armed conflict and military tension. He claimed "any more of the patience and tolerance will only encourage even greater provocations." He even labeled those who supported the peaceful engagement approach to North Korea as supporters of North Korea. This is an unacceptable political manipulation. It is irresponsible for the government in charge of managing all crises in Korea in the past three years to blame others for the current crisis.

The military tension in the West Sea is not new in nature. The maritime demarcation is still ambiguous, and talks have not reached an agreement yet since 1991 when two Koreas agreed to hold talks to clarify borders in their Basic Agreements. One must note that in the joint statement of October 4th, 2007, the heads of two Koreas agreed to designate the trouble water in the West Sea as a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the West Sea. Unfortunately, this agreement has been annulled by the current government of South Korea.

In the previous two governments, each time there was an exchange of fire in the West Sea, two Korea still maintained minimum communication and crisis management system

by holding summit meetings and establishing a hot line. It was to prevent escalation of military conflict. However, under the Lee's government, such minimum talks or preventive measures have totally disappeared as accusation, ignorance and confrontation were let loose between two Koreas. The measures introduced by the current government of South Korea are full of harsh rhetoric but lack real crisis management measures.

North Korea's bombardment on Yeonpyeong Island is no doubt an unprecedented military provocation. However, before assessing it as a 'consequence of the humiliating peace' it is necessary to rationally recall the course of inter-Korea relationship in the past three years. Has there been a moment of active peaceful engagement with North Korea to improve relationship? Lee's government would find it difficult to deny that most of its proposals and talks towards North Korea were to bring the other side to its knees. Lee's North Korea policy known as 'Non-nuclear Opening 3000' was, for example, to give economic support if North Korea surrenders. This is far from any diplomatic language or gesture to make a relationship.

Furthermore, by nullifying the June 15th and October 4th Inter-Korea Agreements, Lee's government undermined sustainability, predictability and credibility of inter-Korea agreements. It is also highly questionable if there was any prudence when the head of the intelligence agency announced ill health of the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and media followed it by painting a near-collapse situation in Pyongyang. When Lee's government openly made its new military strategy public, it shocked observers: it contained plans to capture Pyongyang to capture North Korean leadership, dismantle weapons of mass destruction, and stabilize North Korea. The ROK-US joint military exercises of the past six months were mostly not defensive, but provocative in the way they assumed occupation of North Korea. What the development of the past three years points to is that responsibility of today's crisis lies both on North Korea's military adventurism and South Korea's unilateralism.

We have no wish to defend military adventurists of North Korea, and their attack on Yeonpyeong Island should be denounced by all, both in Korea and by the international community. At the same time, we want to stress that the US and South Korea should not forget the historical lesson that unilateralism of the stronger side results in repulsion and adventurism of the weaker side. Expanding a localized provocation to a conflict in the whole peninsular can never be an objective in counter strategies. Then, Lee's government must take it as an obligation to put alternative approaches in place to restore crisis management mechanisms, instead of augmenting military tension. See the predicament of the mightiest military power in Iraq and Afghanistan: there is no military might that alone guarantees perfect defense.

In the regard, the military counter-measures that the current ROK government is going to employ raise serious concerns. Lee's government is to change the current code of proportional engagement (cannon shooting to counter cannon shooting) into a new code of multiplied retaliatory engagement (naval and air-force attack to counter cannon shooting). This is to apply the so-called principle of sufficiency. This is a dangerous idea. The code of proportional engagement has played a role of preventing escalation of

conflict whenever there was a clash between two Koreas. Along with the rising destructive power of newly deployed weapons, this rule is more necessary today than before. Discarding it will encourage further military adventurism trying to make the whole peninsula a conflict area.

Behind the intention to revise the code of engagement lies the ROK government confidence that the South's military force is stronger than the North's. In other words, it is based on the dissatisfaction that the South, though able, is made unable to punish the North because of the rule of proportionality. If it is revised, it may soothe some sectors of the public in South Korea that are in anger against the North Korea's attack, but will face the other larger sectors of the public at awe that wish neither military clash nor escalation into war. Instead of shifting to retaliation, Lee's government should employ rational principles of consistency in its defense policy and code of engagement such as proportionality, inevitability, and emergency. The best way is to avoid a hostile engagement, and when it is inevitable, the next best way is to use restrained force in an effective way.

Since the attack on Yeonpyeong Island, the military budget is likely to make a big leap. Yesterday, the parliamentary defense committee passed a military budget plan of 8.1% increase for the next year (31.9 trillion won / 31.9 billion dollars), much larger than the earlier proposal of 5.8% increase. PSPD criticizes this decision because this is a random inflation of the budget making use of the Yeonpyeong incident, but without due scrutiny over the need and utility. The National Assembly(parliament) must ask in its budgetary review session whether it was the shortage of budget and arms or inefficient use of the large armament in hand that lies behind the failure in defense in Yeonpyeong incident.

We are also concerned that Lee's government has been stressing 'readiness to counter North Korea's asymmetrical threat and localized provocation' in its demand for military budget expansion. Yeonpyeong incident is used as a moment to carry this appeal further. The claim that there is an 'asymmetrical threat' indicates that South Korea's military force already substantially outstands that of North Korea. The South Korean military has made public its confidence and strategic superiority when it explained the new North Korea's contingency plan. All are geared towards much higher military spending and deployment of the most advanced weapons system. However, we must note that such a development will heighten North Korea's military insecurity and force it to resort on other kinds of asymmetrical military power. We hold the view that if South Korea reduces and diverts some of the current armament for full-scale war towards defense against localized battles, it will be able to reduce military spending and have efficient defense readiness at the same time. This reform will require reduction of the over-expanded land force, over-numbered army generals, and those unnecessary units for full-scale warfare and occupation of North Korea.

It may be a political rhetoric to say "humiliating peace based on intimidation will bring worse consequences", but certainly not a proper statement by a responsible president. Perhaps, the militarist forces in North Korea are making similar statements and preparing equally non-proportional ways of engagement. Intentions to overwhelm or subdue the

other side by military means only increase mutual mistrust and the danger of armed conflict. And deeper insecurity and larger cost fall upon the people. What Lee's government should do is to move away from unilateral high stance towards North Korea and instead to place crisis management measures towards making peace. The logic of punishment by might cannot foster peace.

Drawing a Line in the Water
By Selig S. Harrison
December 12, 2010

THE crisis in the Yellow Sea, which was set off by the North Korean shelling of South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island last month, is probably mystifying to many Americans. Why did the North fire a deadly artillery barrage at a sparsely inhabited, relatively insignificant island? Why has the United States dispatched an entire aircraft-carrier group to the scene?

But things make more sense if you look at recent events as merely the latest in a decades-long series of naval clashes between the two Koreas resulting from a disputed sea boundary that was hastily imposed by the United Nations forces — without North Korean agreement — after the 1953 armistice that halted the Korean War. Several times the dispute has flared into bloody naval battles, most notably in 1999, when at least 17 North Korean sailors died, and in 2002, when four South Koreans and at least 30 North Koreans were killed.

In October 2007 it seemed like the cycle might be broken: Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader, and President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea pledged to hold talks on a joint fishing area in the Yellow Sea “to avoid accidental clashes.” But that December, the hard-liner Lee Myung-bak was elected president of South Korea; he promptly disowned the accord, which kicked off the most recent chapter in the dispute.

North Korea responded. It quickly built up its shore artillery near the disputed waters, accused Seoul of violating its territory, and in 2008 launched short-range missiles into the contested waters. This March, a South Korean Navy ship, the Cheonan, was sunk by what a South Korean inquiry concluded was a North Korean torpedo attack. And on Nov. 9, two weeks before the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island began, a North Korean naval patrol crossed the disputed line and exchanged fire with South Korean vessels.

Can anything be done to put an end to the simmering conflict in the Yellow Sea? Yes, and the solution could be quite straightforward: the United States should redraw the disputed sea boundary, called the Northern Limit Line, moving it slightly to the south.

The Northern Limit Line was so named because it was meant to impose a limit on any potential South Korean encroachment into North Korea. The South's president, Syngman Rhee, still dreamed of winning the war — he refused to sign the armistice — and repeatedly vowed to overthrow the Pyongyang regime.

Rhee's hopes were never realized, but one thing the Northern Limit Line did was to give the best fishing grounds in the area to South Korea. It's no coincidence that many of the clashes there have occurred during the summer crab-fishing season. If the boundary were refashioned in a more equitable way, tensions would undoubtedly ease.

And, fortunately, President Obama has the authority to redraw the line. On July 7, 1950, a United Nations Security Council resolution established the United Nations Command for Korea and designated the United States as the executive agent, with authority to name its commander. That original command is still with us today in vestigial form. It is commanded by Gen. Walter Sharp, who is thus the current successor to Gen. Mark Clark, who signed the 1953 armistice.

The Obama administration would do well to consult with both Seoul and Pyongyang on where to best set the new boundary, get an agreement from both governments to abide by it, and put it on the map. South Korea should not be given a veto over the redrawing. And North Korea should be warned that any future provocations on its part like the shelling of Yeonpyeong will result in swift, appropriate retaliation by the joint forces of the United States and South Korea.

Ideally, redrawing the line would not only ease the present crisis, but also set the stage for negotiations among the United States, North Korea and China on a peace treaty that would replace the temporary armistice and formally end the Korean War. (Since South Korea did not sign the armistice, it cannot sign a peace treaty, but North Korea has agreed that Seoul could be part of a future trilateral peacekeeping body.)

One possible mechanism to replace the armistice is the “trilateral peace regime” for the peninsula that has been proposed by North Korea’s principal military spokesman, Gen. Ri Chan-bok. Under the plan, the armed forces of the United States, North Korea and South Korea would set up a “mutual security assurance commission.” Its role would be to prevent incidents in the demilitarized zone that could threaten the peace and to develop arms-control and confidence-building arrangements on the peninsula. General Ri has said explicitly that the North would not object to the presence of American forces on the peninsula if the armistice and the United Nations Command were replaced.

Defusing tensions in the Yellow Sea and keeping the peace at the demilitarized zone are the prerequisites for pursuing the larger goals that should govern United States policy in Korea: eliminating nuclear weapons on the peninsula and establishing normal diplomatic relations with the Pyongyang regime, all in the aim of reducing the risk of American involvement in another Korean War.

Selig S. Harrison, the author of “Korean Endgame,” is the director of the Asia program at the Center for International Policy.

**U.S. Statement to the IAEA: DPRK, IAEA Board of Governors Meeting
Agenda Item 6(a) Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK), U.S. Statement
Ambassador Glyn T. Davies, and U.S. Permanent Representative to the
International Atomic Energy Agency
December 2-3, 2010**

Mr. Chairman,

Once again, this Board meets against the backdrop of disturbing news regarding North Korea's nuclear program. As noted by the Director General, North Korea has recently disclosed to visiting U.S. scientists ongoing activity at Yongbyon, including the existence of a uranium enrichment program. If true, these disclosures validate our long-standing concerns about the DPRK's clandestine enrichment activities. These developments have serious implications for the international nonproliferation regime and are a clear manifestation of the risks posed by North Korea's defiance of its international obligations and commitments. They further heighten our concerns about its nuclear program and the threat it poses to international peace and security.

Mr. Chairman,

The revelations North Korea made to Ambassador Jack Pritchard and to Dr. Siegfried Hecker on their recent unofficial trips have been widely reported in the press. Dr. Hecker has also made his account of the visit available publicly. But let me review the facts as the United States sees them:

- A little over two weeks ago, DPRK authorities told visiting American scientists that, at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, North Korea is constructing a new light water nuclear reactor and has built a uranium enrichment plant, containing approximately 2000 centrifuges, that is operating and that is producing low-enriched uranium. The DPRK officials stated that this construction had begun in April of 2009.
- As you'll recall, April 2009 is around the same time that the DPRK expelled IAEA personnel and U.S. disablement teams who were monitoring the Yongbyon facilities.
- We believe North Korea has been pursuing enrichment for an extended period of time - long before April 2009 when the DPRK claims to have begun its Yongbyon enrichment facility construction.
- Based on the apparent scale of the facility, the fast progress the DPRK has made in its construction, and the evidence going back years that North Korea has tried to procure enrichment-related material from abroad, it is likely that North Korea had been pursuing an enrichment capability long before the April 2009 date it now claims. If so, there is a clear likelihood that DPRK has built other uranium enrichment-related facilities in its territory.
- These actions by North Korea are clear violations of the sanctions regime established by UN Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874 and of its commitments under the 2005

Joint Statement.

- These new revelations must be viewed in light of North Korea's long track record of proliferation and of pursuit of nuclear weapons.
- If the assertions by North Korea are true, a uranium enrichment capability in the DPRK could bolster its pursuit of a weapons capability and increases our concerns about prospects for onward proliferation of fissile material and of sensitive technologies to other parties.
- It is imperative that North Korea fulfill its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement and comply with its obligations under Resolutions 1718 and 1874 by immediately ceasing all nuclear programs and related activities, including those related to its uranium enrichment program.
- These revelations by North Korea underscore the critical need to effectively close all avenues for the DPRK to circumvent United Nations sanctions. All countries must be vigilant and redouble efforts to implement the relevant UN Security Council resolutions fully and transparently. To do otherwise would be to imperil the international nonproliferation regime which helps safeguard against the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies and weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Chairman,

Our position remains the same. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. We remain committed to the 2005 Joint Statement and its core goal of the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. We are consulting closely with our Five-Party partners on these new developments. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Ambassador Stephen Bosworth recently led a U.S. delegation to Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing to discuss next steps; we have also discussed these matters with Moscow. We are all in strong agreement that a multilateral diplomatic approach remains essential and that we are committed to the full implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement, including, the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Consistent with the requirements of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874, the United States and our Five-Party partners also continue to maintain our strong interest in the return of IAEA inspectors to the DPRK. To that end, we encourage the Secretariat to maintain the capability to re-establish implementation of verification activities in the DPRK. We seek an immediate halt of all nuclear activities in the DPRK, including enrichment, leading to verifiable and irreversible denuclearization, and to North Korea's return, at an early date, to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**GPPAC Northeast Asia Statement for Peace on the Korean Peninsula
December 2, 2010**

We, the undersigned members of civil society organizations, are shocked at the artillery exchange between North and South Korea on November 23, 2010, that caused the tragic killing of and injuries to the people of Yeonpyeong Island. We extend our deepest condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives and to the communities affected. We categorically condemn the attack that caused the tragedy, no matter what background there might be for the respective governments.

We are also gravely concerned about the developments after the incident. The tension caused through military activities and provocative behavior among policy makers and even the public is growing. While we understand the emotions behind these reactions, an escalation of tension would only lead to further violence and confrontations. We must ease tensions, and work together to find creative, peaceful solutions. Dialogue is the only way to proceed. The people of Northeast Asia should be united in calling for peace.

We hereby call on all the governments and people concerned to commit to the following:

1. Stop military activities now. A ceasefire must be declared by North and South Korea immediately. Military exercises in and around the area are counterproductive and should be stopped. All the parties must refrain from any acts that increase tension in the region.
2. Work to start dialogue. The governments of North and South Korea must arrange diplomatic talks as soon as possible, and other governments should work to make such talks a success. Regional dialogue should also be pursued, including an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks.
3. Investigate the incident. Attention should be paid to the fact that the area of this incident has long been disputed between North and South Korea. All the parties should therefore have fully refrained from provocation and military actions. International investigation needs to be carried out to clarify exactly what happened.
4. Do not start an arms race. No government should use this event as an excuse for military build-up or an increase of military expenditure. Build-up of military capability would not prevent conflicts, but rather trigger an arms race. An arms race would not only deprive the people in need of their limited resources, but also risk additional confrontations. Regional cooperative disarmament measures and security arrangements should instead be developed.
5. Create and expand Demilitarized Zones. We call on the governments of North and South Korea to work to establish a Peace and Cooperation Zone in the West Sea/Yellow Sea as agreed in the Joint Statement of the North-South Summit of October 4, 2007, with a view to preventing conflicts in the area. We further call for the creation and expansion of Demilitarized Zones (DMZs) in other disputed areas in the region. In

such zones, military activities, including exercises, should be prohibited, and confidence-building measures such as dialogue and transparency programs should be implemented.

6. Civil society has a critical role to play. Civil society actors such as NGOs, academic institutions and the media can play a critical role to facilitate the processes outlined above. Governments should allow and encourage them to play their legitimate roles. The media has a special responsibility to refrain from any provocation. Rather, the media should promote a balanced analysis and facilitate dialogue.

This tragic incident reminded us of the fact that our region is still divided and suffering from the remnants of the Cold War. More than half a century since the armistice was declared in the Korean War, a peace regime needs to be realized on the Korean Peninsula, along with a peace mechanism in Northeast Asia as a whole. Recalling the North-South Declarations of June 15, 2000, and October 4, 2007, and the Joint Statement of Six-Party Talks of September 19, 2005, we call on the governments concerned to make further efforts, and reaffirm our commitment to strive to achieve these goals.

Statement from The United Church of Canada
By Omega Bula, Executive Minister
December 1, 2010

Dear Friends:

It is with great concern that we follow the news of the violence and the ongoing situation of danger in the Korean Peninsula. We uphold you in our thoughts and prayers. We share in your grief for the loss of lives and the suffering that the violence has caused to the Korean people in the South and the North.

We join you in calling all governments to stop escalating the tension and to engage in negotiations and dialogue to solve the crisis. We will be asking the members of United Church to sign the petition that the Presbyterian Church in the Republic of Korea will be circulating.

We hope for immediate action by governments to resolve the present crisis. Be assured that United Church will continue to work with you for lasting peace and security for the people in the Korean peninsula.

May the Advent promise of the coming of the God of peace and justice sustain your hope during this time of great suffering and anxiety. May it strengthen your resolve to "seek peace and pursue it" (Psalm 34:14)

Sincerely,

Omega Bula
Executive Minister
Justice, Global and Ecumenical Relations Unit
The United Church of Canada

We need Diplomacy, not War, on the Korean Peninsula

By Jonathan Evans

November 30, 2010

As indicated by Joe's November 24 blog post, the foreign policy focus of FCNL and much of the world shifted to the Korean peninsula as a result of last week's events. Personally, I suddenly found myself shifted back in time to the 2001-2005 period when I was living in Indonesia and deeply involved in development and relief work across the East and Southeast Asia region. During that time, I made two trips to North Korea — each of about two-weeks duration. Following my second trip to North Korea, I visited South Korea for the first time.

My most enduring memories from my visits to the Korean peninsula are of the Korean people and their hospitality. With them in mind, my FCNL colleagues and I extend condolences and sympathies to the families, friends and extended communities of those who lost their lives and were injured in the tragic escalation of violence in the November 23 Yeonpyeong island incident. We are holding in the Light the people who are suffering from emotional trauma as a result of the rapidly-rising tensions between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.

My first view of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) was from the North Korean side during a trip to the city of Kaesong. Following that visit, I traveled to South Korea (via Beijing, China) for the first time. There are many images that endure in my memory from the two sides of the border. Most of them are contrasting: hugely different standards of living; widely divergent agricultural practices and health care systems; and strikingly different states of infrastructure, levels of environmental degradation, and the like. But a significant similarity one finds on both sides of the border is the heavy militarization. The Korean peninsula could go up in flames very quickly if the 1953 armistice were broken and full-scale warfare resumed. We have a responsibility to do everything possible to prevent that from happening.

The U.S. is rightly looking to China to help keep the peace. The Obama administration appears, however, to be ambivalent about the role that China should play. As reported in today's New York Times, the Chinese have proposed emergency talks with North Korea. But the U.S. and South Korea have balked at the idea and continue instead to focus on high-profile military exercises in the Yellow Sea, a maritime area in which both China and North Korea have a significant interest. The U.S. should follow the lead of the Japanese who, according to a report in The Washington Post, will be sending an envoy to China for North Korea talks.

More objective media reporting will also aid diplomacy and help ease tensions. The initial U.S. media reports about the military confrontation on and around Yeonpyeong island seemed reflexively to take a U.S. and South Korea viewpoint and to ignore the North Korean perspective. Those reports assumed that North Korea was in the wrong. To understand the context of the conflict that took place, it is important to hear the North Korean perspective, including the important consideration that North Korea does not accept the Northern Limit Line that was established by the United Nations Command at the conclusion of the 1950-53 Korean War. Historian Andrew Salmon, writing for the BBC, makes this point and provides a helpful historical perspective on the disputed Yellow Sea maritime area in a November 25 piece. One may not agree with or fully

understand the North Korea perspective, but to ignore it or dismiss it entirely is irresponsible and extremely perilous.

We would do well to listen to the voices of those who are closest to the conflict. In a November 26 statement from Seoul, the National Council of Churches in Korea reminds us:

As we have so often repeated in the past, these exercises of political and military brinkmanship serve no purpose other than to escalate tensions in Korea and to threaten the peace in the whole Northeast Asian region. The presence of a great number of nuclear weapons on land and on the surrounding seas makes Korea a tinderbox that threatens the peace of the whole world.

And the Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute, a civil society peacebuilding group representing voices from throughout Northeast Asia, issued a statement yesterday which included this point:

We call for dialogue to be resumed, both bilaterally between North and South Korea and between two Koreas and other nations, and multilaterally including forums such as the Six-Party Talks.

In sum, it is time to ease the tensions between North and South Korea through diplomacy and by moving quickly towards a resumption of the “six-party talks” (North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the U.S.) aimed at “denuclearizing” the Korean peninsula and normalizing relations in the post-Cold War era. Please take a few minutes to write President Obama and/or send a letter to your local paper to convey this message.

**Address to the Nation by President Lee Myung-bak on the Shelling of
Yeonpyeongdo by North Korea
November 29, 2010**

Fellow Koreans,

Today, I am standing here keenly aware that I am responsible for not having been able to protect the lives and property of the people. I understand very well that you were greatly disappointed with how we responded to the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo(Yeonpyeong Island) by North Korea.

I feel enormous frustration and regret over the fact that innocent lives were lost and the homes and livelihood of the islanders were devastated.

I pray for the repose of the souls of Staff Sergeant Seo Jung-woo and Lance Corporal Moon Kwang-wook as well as the two civilian casualties—Mr. Kim Chi-baek and Mr. Bae Bok-chul. I also once again extend my heartfelt condolences to their families. I hope that those who were injured will recover quickly. I promise to urgently come up with the comprehensive measures to help the islanders of Yeonpyeongdo.

Fellow citizens,

North Korea's provocation this time was entirely different and unprecedented in nature. Since the end of the Korean War, the North has perpetrated numerous provocations, but it has never launched a direct attack onto our territory before. Making matters worse, it indiscriminately shelled the island where some 1,400 residents are peacefully living.

A military attack against civilians is strictly prohibited even in time of war; it is a crime against humanity.

Only a few meters away from where shells landed, there is a school where classes were going on. I am outraged by the ruthlessness of the North Korean regime, which is even indifferent to the lives of little children.

Countries around the world are joining us in denouncing North Korea.

We have thus far tolerated provocations by the North time and again. On January 21, 1968, North Korean commandos infiltrated into Seoul with the intent of killing the President. The North has already tried and failed twice to kill the South Korean head of state. North Korean agents blew up a civilian airplane in 1987, taking the lives of 115 passengers.

South Korea nonetheless endured these continual provocations because we entertained a slight hope that the North would change course someday and an unwavering commitment to peace on the Korean Peninsula. Over the past 20 years, therefore, South Korea has

striven to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through dialogue and collaboration while at the same time providing unstinted humanitarian assistance.

North Korea, on the other hand, responded with a series of provocative acts, including the development of a nuclear program, the sinking of the Navy corvette Cheonan by an explosion and the shelling of Yeonpyeongdo.

At long last, we came to a realization that it no longer makes sense for us to anticipate that the North would abandon its nuclear program or its policy of brinkmanship on its own. The South Korean people now unequivocally understand that prolonged endurance and tolerance will spawn nothing but more serious provocations.

Those who have so far supported the North Korean regime might now see its true colors.

We are aware of the historic lesson that a disgraceful peace achieved through intimidation only brings about greater harm in the end. Only courage that defies retreat under any threat or provocation will bring about genuine peace. If the North commits any additional provocations against the South, we will make sure that it pays a dear price without fail.

I have confidence in the courage and potential of the citizens of Korea. We are a great people who, as of this year, have built the world's seventh largest export powerhouse in the face of the North's incessant menace and belligerence. In the current national crisis situation, the Korean people have demonstrated patriotism and composure.

Many young men and women went to the wake of the young soldiers who were killed in action. Citizens have volunteered to collect donations and have gone about their business with fortitude. The Republic of Korea is going to be safe and sound because of you.

There was a split in public opinion over the torpedoing of the Cheonan. Unlike that time, our people have united as one this time. Amid such unity and determination, any surreptitious attempt to create divisiveness in the nation will have no chance of success. Along with all the citizens of the Republic, I will never retreat.

The international community, too, is supporting us. Leaders of the United States, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom as well as Russia and many other countries condemned the act of brutality by the North and are standing in full support of our position. Especially, as our ally, the United States has demonstrated a strong resolve to respond by taking action.

Fellow Koreans,

The courageous members of our Armed Forces have fought well. Some soldiers dashed to fulfill their duties without even noticing that the camouflage on their helmets had caught fire in the barrage of live shells. Those who were on leave of absence promptly returned to their units.

Citizens of Korea,

From now on, the Government will do whatever is required of it without fail.

The Government will establish Armed Forces that live up to their name. We will defend the five West Sea Islands near the northern sea border with a watertight stance against any kind of provocation. We will proactively carry out the defense reform as planned in order to make our Armed Forces even stronger.

Fellow Koreans,

Now is the time we have to demonstrate our determination with actions rather than many words.

I plead with you to have confidence in the Government and the Armed Forces and rally around our cause.

Unity is the best national security measure.

Thank you very much.

Asia Foundation

China's call for six party talks: Cynical or Naïve?

November 29, 2010

By Scott Snyder

China's response to North Korea's artillery shelling of South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island last week has been relatively rapid compared to the slowness of its response to the sinking last March (it took three weeks for the Chinese government to express its condolences in response to the sinking of the Cheonan). But, as underscored in Sunday's *New York Times* Week in Review and Aidan-Foster Carter's article in *Foreign Policy*, it is unlikely to satisfy American expectations. China's proposal of an emergency session of the six parties is a non-starter that confuses form versus substance. Resumption of Six Party Talks would be a way of affirming what President Obama called last June China's "willful blindness" toward North Korea by perpetuating the illusion that diplomatic efforts to deal with North Korea have not failed.

As a practical matter, there are four preconditions for Six Party Talks to be viable as a framework for addressing current issues on the agenda. First, as the United States and South Korea have emphasized, it is necessary for North Korea to show tangible steps as evidence of its willingness to return to the path of denuclearization. This is a main purpose of the talks, but there is no basis for resuming talks unless all parties affirm their commitment to the denuclearization objective. Absent that commitment, a call for five-party talks would be the next best option.

Second, Six Party Talks have little prospect for success in the absence of a stabilized inter-Korean relationship, but this will be difficult to achieve especially following the Yeonpyeong shelling. Third, Six Party talks cannot succeed in the absence of a U.S.-DPRK channel for dialogue. North Korea has systematically placed obstacles in the way of such a dialogue since the Obama administration has come into office; revelations to American visitors regarding Pyongyang's progress in developing an enriched uranium capability were a step in exactly the wrong direction. Fourth, there must be evidence that China can effectively persuade North Korea not only to cease provocations but to integrate with the international community, but there has been precious little evidence of China's persuasiveness since Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Pyongyang in October of 2009.

China faces an even more difficult challenge in managing its diplomacy toward the two Koreas following the Yeonpyeong incident, especially given the damage North Korea has done to China's own national security interests. The Chinese foreign ministry objected to U.S.-ROK exercises involving the USS George Washington in its exclusive economic zone but could do nothing to prevent them from going forward. Lee Myung-Bak requested in a meeting with State Councillor Dai Bingguo that China take a "fairer and more responsible position" in dealing with the two Koreas, and China and North Korea are set to exchange high-level visits this week. A first step toward creating the conditions for resumption of Six Party Talks would be evidence that China can persuade North Korea to take concrete actions to restore the basis for Six Party talks. Otherwise, China's

call for a return to Six Party Talks will stand as a symbol of China's own diplomatic limitations rather than as a serious effort to tamp down tensions on the Korean peninsula.

NARPI Proposal for Peace on the Korean Peninsula

November 29, 2010

The Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute(NARPI), as a civil society peacebuilding group representing voices from throughout Northeast Asia, wishes to express concern for the safety and peace of the Korean peninsula and the region. The events of November 23, 2010, including artillery exchange between South and North Korea, the resulting loss of life, and the ongoing experience of tension and fear, remind us of the critical need for peaceful resolution and the implementation of measures which will prevent future military action and loss.

Civilians of the Korean peninsula do not wish to find themselves on the frontlines of a military conflict. In particular, a war strongly influenced by international actors including the US and China, playing out on the Korean peninsula, would be a painful reminder of the 1950-1953 Korean War. To prevent further conflict and loss and to ensure sustainable peace, the Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute proposes the following:

1. We call for dialogue to be resumed, both bilaterally between North and South Korea and between two Koreas and other nations, and multilaterally including forums such as the Six-Party Talks. The focus of such multilateral dialogue should include realistic solutions for peace on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia as a whole.
2. Instead of the procurement of additional arms, we ask that the process of disarmament begin immediately on both sides, including the abolition of nuclear weapons on the North Korean side. While the increase of arms at this point in time is viewed by many as responsible and necessary, the further preparation of arms only increases the possibility for additional armed conflict, tension and loss of life and property. It is vital at this time that serious attempts are made towards disarmament for the possibility of safety and sustainable peace.
3. That the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), on land as well as in the West Sea, should be respected as a truly demilitarized zone, which means that no military action, including joint military drills and other exercises, would take place within these areas. In addition, we propose that the DMZ be extended a significant distance in both North and South Korea to prevent unintended military exchange such as the events of Yeonpyeong on November 23, 2010. We are also requesting that the international community show their support for this expansion of the DMZ and assist in dialogue related to this issue.

-Northeast Asia Regional Peacebuilding Institute

ASCK Steering Committee Statement on the Current Crisis in Korea

November 27, 2010

The armed forces of North Korea, South Korea, and United States stand poised to wage a war that could destroy the Korean peninsula and engulf the world in a nuclear holocaust. It is a war that can and must be avoided.

Last week, a joint U.S-South Korean military exercise escalated into artillery exchange between the two Koreas. North Korea's artillery bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island killed four and wounded many more. South Korea's response left an as-yet unknown number of casualties in the North. Now the United States and South Korea have begun joint war games in the Yellow Sea. U.S. forces include the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit based in Okinawa, the 7th Air Force stationed in Osan, and the aircraft carrier USS George Washington based in Yokosuka. U.S. and South Korean marines will stage a combined amphibious landing exercise on the west coast of Korea.

These massive military maneuvers are escalating tensions and threaten to trigger general armed conflict. We appeal to all sides to desist immediately from warlike actions and stop this cycle of ever-increasing threats and shows of force. All parties must back down before sparking a conflict that would threaten millions of lives.

Background to the Rapid Military Escalation

On November 22nd, the South Korean and American armed forces began annual military exercises involving 70,000 soldiers deployed throughout the South, including the West Sea. Fifty warships, 90 helicopters, 500 warplanes, and 600 tanks were being mobilized for the war simulation exercises, scheduled to last until the end of the month.

Amidst the tension heightened by the exercise, South Korean marines on Yeonpyeong Island, just seven miles from the North Korean coast, fired an unknown number of artillery shells into waters claimed by both Pyongyang and Seoul. Hours later, the North Korean military began shelling Yeonpyeong, an island with military bases as well as a fishing community of 1,300 residents. The South Korean military responded by firing its own artillery at North Korean bases.

North Korea's attack on Yeonpyeong Island left two soldiers and two civilians dead and over fifteen wounded. Most of the civilians have had to flee the island. The number of casualties and the level of destruction in the North are not known but could be higher, given the technological superiority of the South's artillery.

Immediately following the artillery exchange, President Barack Obama dispatched the George Washington, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, and President Lee Myung-bak announced that the rules of engagement for the South Korean armed forces have been changed, allowing for an asymmetrical response to a North Korean attack. The North ratcheted up the tension with the statement that it "will wage second and even third rounds of attacks without any hesitation, if warmongers in South Korea make reckless

military provocations again.” As the US-South Korea joint military exercises get underway, tensions are rising yet higher.

The Imperative for Negotiations

We deplore all actions that lead to the loss of lives. We denounce the provocative military actions directed at North Korea by South Korea and the United States. We denounce North Korea’s artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island that killed at least four people. We call on the governments of North Korea, South Korea, and the United States to halt their reckless introduction of even greater military force that escalates tensions and risks further loss of life.

We call on all three governments – North Korea, South Korea, and the United States – to stop inflaming an already dangerous situation through their provocative actions and heated rhetoric. They should immediately cease the military exercises and maneuverings that will inevitably escalate tensions.

We call on the three governments to resume negotiations immediately in order to defuse tensions and to work toward finally ending the Korean War. The recent incident on Yeonpyeong is a deeply tragic reminder of the perilous state of ongoing conflict on the Korean peninsula. Since Korea was divided after World War II, a continuing state of war has been the structural cause of artillery exchanges and border clashes. A heightened risk of conflict will remain unless the Korean War is finally brought to an end with a peace treaty, which would establish the mutual recognition of borders and the normalization of relations.

The current crisis therefore underscores the imperative for diplomacy to transform the fragile armistice into a durable structure of peace based on the negotiation of a peace treaty, normalized relations, and the denuclearization of the peninsula. Talks may seem improbable under the present circumstances, but they are needed most when they seem hardest to start. This is such a moment.

**Statement of the Republic of the Philippines On the Artillery Attack on Yeonpyeong Island, Republic of Korea,
The *Malacañan*, Palace Public Information Service Unit, Manila, philippines
November 26, 2010**

The Philippines condemns the artillery attack by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on Yeonpyeong Island, and is gravely concerned over the resulting rise in tensions in the Korean Peninsula. The attack constitutes a clear and flagrant violation of international law.

The Philippines commends the Republic of Korea (ROK) for having demonstrated extraordinary restraint in the wake of the attack on the corvette ROKS Cheonan on 26 March 2010, and again in the wake of this unprovoked and overt attack. We call for the continued exercise of restraint.

The Philippines calls for an end to provocative actions that raise tensions and adversely affect peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia Pacific region.

The Philippines strongly urges the DPRK to abide by its obligations under international law and the UN Charter, and to adhere to the Armistice Agreement of 1953, the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement of 1991, and the Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity of October 4, 2007.

The DFA and the Philippine Embassy in Seoul are closely monitoring developments and reviewing the Contingency Plan to test its current validity. The Embassy has started to coordinate with key agencies such as the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, Department of Labor and Employment, Department of Social welfare and Welfare and Development and the Department of Transportation and Communications to ensure the safety of Filipinos in ROK and the DPRK. The Philippines calls for peace and seeks an end to the instability in the region.

PSPD (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy)

PSPD's Statement on North Korea firing artillery at South Korean island of Yeonpyeong and the artillery exchanges between North and South Korea November 25, 2010

PSPD strongly denounces North Korea firing artillery at Yeonpyeong Island of South Korea

- Both North and South Korea should put all the efforts not to have further military hostilities
- Fundamental measures are required to prevent the vicious circle of armed clashes in the Yellow Sea

Yesterday(Nov 23), North Korea launched around 170 artillery fires at Yeonpyeong Island where 'Hogook' military exercise was being conducted by the South Korean military, and South Korea exchanged 80 artillery fires in response. It has been one year that North and South naval forces confronted and exchanged fires in the Yellow Sea(Nov 10, 2009). Reportedly, two marines and two civilians were killed and 18 people, including 3 civilians, were wounded in Yeonpyeong Island. Supposedly, North Korea also got considerable damage.

First of all, PSPD expresses the deepest condolences for the deceased marines and civilians their families, and hopes wounded marines and civilians get better soon.

PSPD(People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) strongly denounces that such an aggressive act of North Korea. PSPD also strongly urges both North and South Korea to refrain from further armed confrontation and immediately initiate a dialogue to seek a peaceful measure for controlling a crisis.

Regarding reported facts, the artillery fires of North Korea at Yeonpyeong Island clearly constitutes an aggressive act. North Korea argues that its artillery fires were a response to the artillery exercise of the 'Hogook' military exercise of South Korea. However, North Korea's artillery is beyond a reasonable defense measure in terms of the principle of proportionality and inevitability.

Additionally, North Korea's artillery fires killed two civilians who were employed for building a military barrack, wounded three civilians, and damaged civilian facilities and houses. Whatever North Korea's intention is, the fire of artillery by North Korea, which seriously threatens peace of the Korean peninsula, cannot be a means for solving any problems. PSPD urges North Korea to explain and apologize regarding its artillery fires and take a reasonable action against whom responsible.

As can be seen from the four times of the armed conflicts between North and South Korea in the Yellow Sea, the NLL(Northern Limit Line) adjacent areas have been instable. While the boundary between North and South Korea has remained controversial, and the tense of the military confrontation has been even intensified after hotline between North and South Korea was cut in May 2009. As a result, the area becomes a 'powder keg' of the Korean peninsula. The recent artillery exchanges between North and South Korea in a shock well reveal such high level of instability.

At the moment, the artillery exchanges have been stopped, but there is very high tense around NLL adjacent areas. No more armed conflict should happen. A military retaliation results another rather stronger military retaliation. Both North and South Korea should

put all the efforts not to have further armed confrontations, and they should refrain from making any remarks that could cause further armed conflicts, but they should seek a way to restore a peaceful control of a crisis. Further military confrontation would make both North and South Korea defeated.

□ Appendix. NLL(Northern Limit Line)



The demarcation line in the Yellow Sea(West Sea) between North and South is under dispute.

Northern Limit Line or North Limit Line (NLL) acts as the de facto maritime boundary between the two Koreas. The line was unilaterally set by the U.S.-led United Nations military forces on August 30, 1953, after the United Nations Command and North Korea failed to reach an agreement. It is not officially recognized by North Korea. In particular, it is not included into the Armistice Agreement of 1953 between the two states.

On the other hand, North Korea has insisted its own marine demarcation line, which is located more Southern direction than NLL. Yeonpyong Island is located between two different demarcation lines as can be seen from the map.

Due to such disagreement, there have been three armed conflicts between naval forces between North and South Korea and there are always tense over fishing ships' moves. When there was Summit meeting between North and South Korea, they reached the agreement to build a common fishing zone around NLL to prevent conflicts in the '10.4

Declaration'. However, the Lee Myung-bak government announced the discard of the 10.4 declaration including the common fishing zone.

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei's Remarks on Exchange of Fire between the DPRK and ROK

Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei

November 25, 2010

Mr. Yang Jing, Special Envoy of President Hu Jintao and Minister of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission will attend on invitation the celebration that marks the 50th anniversary of independence of Central Africa on December 1.

Q: First, after the exchange of fire between the DPRK and the ROK, countries including the US condemned the DPRK's firing of artillery shells on Yeonpyeong Island. What is China's position? Second, how do you comment on the US-ROK joint military exercise in the Yellow Sea which is to start from November 28?

A: On your first question, paying great attention to the incident, China expresses grief and regret over the casualties and property losses that the incident has caused as well as concern over the development of the situation. Holding that parties involved should settle their disputes peacefully through dialogue and consultation to be jointly committed to peace and stability on the Peninsula, we oppose any act that undermines peace and stability on the Peninsula. China strongly calls on the DPRK and the ROK to keep calm and exercise restraint, conduct dialogue and contact as soon as possible to avoid recurrence of similar incidents. All parties concerned should do more to ease the situation and contribute to peace and stability on the Peninsula. We are ready to work with other parties towards this end.

On your second question, we have taken note of relevant report and express concern. China's position on the issue is consistent and clear.

Q: According to the White House, the US expects to have high-level communication with China in the coming days to discuss the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Could you confirm? What specific measures will China take to ease the situation and safeguard peace and stability on the Peninsula? What measures do you expect from the US side?

A: China and the US have maintained close communication on the situation on the Peninsula and related issues. China believes that under the current circumstances, parties concerned should do more to ease the situation and contribute to peace and stability on the Peninsula. China is ready to work with other parties towards this end.

Under the current circumstances, it's imperative and important to resume the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible. We hope relevant parties make joint efforts and properly address each party's concerns through dialogue and consultation within the framework of the Six-Party Talks so as to realize peace and stability on the Peninsula as well as enduring peace in Northeast Asia.

Q: Has China had any communication with the DPRK on the issue?

A: China stays in close communication with all parties concerned. We always maintain that relevant parties should settle their disputes peacefully through dialogue and consultation to be jointly committed to peace and stability on the Peninsula.

Q: The DPRK and the ROK accused each other of opening fire first. What is your opinion?

A: As you have noticed, parties involved made different claims about the cause of the incident. China calls on both the DPRK and the ROK to keep calm and exercise restraint, conduct dialogue and contact as soon as possible to avoid recurrence of similar incidents.

Q: About the DPRK showing its uranium enrichment facilities to the US scientist, do you have anything more to say? It's said that part of the technology comes from China. How do you comment?

A: We believe that all countries should implement Security Council resolutions on the DPRK nuclear issue in a serious and precise manner. China has been conscientiously fulfilling its international obligations in a responsible attitude and dedicating itself to denuclearization on the Peninsula as well as peace and stability on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia according to the spirit of Security Council resolutions. We hope that parties concerned make joint efforts to create conditions for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks so as to bring the DPRK nuclear issue back to the track of dialogue and consultation, addressing each party's concerns properly within the framework of the Six-Party Talks and materializing goals set in September 19 Joint Statement comprehensively.

Q: Do you think the exchange of fire should be discussed at the Security Council?

A: China is highly concerned of the issue. We call on the DPRK and the ROK to have dialogue and contact as soon as possible to avoid recurrence of similar incidents. It is hoped that relevant parties keep calm, exercise restraint and do more to ease the situation and contribute to peace and stability on the Peninsula. China is ready to stay in communication with other parties and work together towards this end.

North Korea's Dangerous Escalation
By The Diplomat
November 24, 2010

The Diplomat talks to Korea analyst L. Gordon Flake about this week's artillery exchange between North and South Korea.

The shelling by North Korea yesterday of the South Korean border island of Yeonpyeong is being described by many as one of the most serious incidents since the end of the Korean War. How much of an escalation would you say yesterday's exchange of fire marks?

It's a very serious escalation in what has been a series of provocations. The reason why people are more concerned about this than previous incidents such as ship-to-ship firing or firing out into the open ocean is because artillery shells were directed at an actual military base, resulting in South Korean service members being killed and, perhaps most troubling, civilians being killed. The images that one sees now of burning houses and an island with plumes of smoke rising skyward are alarming to say the least.

In a broader context, of course North Korea disputes the Northern Limit Line, and this dispute could be viewed as an inter-Korean clash. But this is a line that has been in existence for 60 years and South Korea has undertaken military exercises on a very regular basis. So there was clearly a decision on the part of North of Korea to escalate the situation in an extremely troubling way.

I'd also point out a very important contrast between this and what happened with the Cheonan in March. When the Cheonan was sunk, it was done at night and in stormy weather—there was a lot of ambiguity about what had happened and who had done it. As a result, I think the government in South Korea showed a remarkable degree of forbearance in conducting a methodical and international investigation before moving forward, and even then moving forward in a very careful way.

This time, I don't think President Lee Myung-bak and his administration have that same luxury in that there's no question about where the artillery shells came from, there's no question in terms of the impact on the lives of those living on the island and the fact that you now have refugees from the immediate damage. And so there's going to be tremendous demand for a rather immediate physical response. The challenge, of course, is that they are faced with a North Korea that has threatened an immediate escalation, and so it's difficult to know how to respond to the damage done to your country and the lives lost and yet not be precipitous.

Is there any indication at all as to why North Korea chose this moment to escalate? Could the succession issue have played any part?

It's always a dangerous thing to try and put yourself in North Korea's shoes to try and explain their behaviour. I'm always aware of the fact that there's an ongoing dialogue on an inter-Korean basis that we're not always privy to. So on one level, this is an inter-

Korean issue on a long-standing dispute and the North Koreans will, and already have, argued that this was an exercise that was firing into North Korean waters.

But the fact is that this was a South Korean military exercise like the ones conducted in August and September; there was firing by the South Korean military, but into the open ocean. North Korea itself has had periods where it has fired into the open ocean as well and warned ships to stay out of the area. But that is a very different thing from targeting a specific base and places of residence. So that's why this is considered so much of an escalation.

In terms of a specific justification this time around, it's hard to see one. In my more conspiratorial moments I would tie it to the announcement that North Korea has a highly-enriched uranium development programme, and the fact that the United States is just gearing up an international response and co-ordinating with its allies South Korea and Japan and also with the Chinese and the Russians to make clear in the United Nations that developing a highly-enriched uranium programme is a clear violation of standing UN Security Council resolutions. So, by just days later provoking a confrontation, this could be seen as a diversionary tactic, to divert the attention of the world away from the enrichment programme and at the same time giving a clear warning that North Korea is a very dangerous place.

Is it tied to the succession? It's a compelling narrative to say that the North Koreans are trying to build up the military credentials of Kim Jong-un. That narrative makes some sense, but at the same time, in great contrast to the early 1980s when Kim Jong-il step by step took power from his father, I think it's notable that as of the party congress, Kim Jong-il hasn't given up any power—he's maintained all his posts. And while he has given his son some very honorific titles, I've yet to see any real responsibilities being given to Kim Jong-un or him taking responsibilities himself. So it may well be that this incident is being used to burnish his credentials domestically, although I don't see this as having actually been initiated by Kim Jong-un. That said, this is a very opaque system, so it's hard to say.

What options does South Korea realistically have to respond?

The challenge is this: South Korea needs to respond in a manner that makes clear the gravity of North Korea's actions and to ensure there's some type of deterrent effect in the response. It could be argued that the failure to do that in response to the sinking of the Cheonan in the spring essentially encouraged this further provocation. And, as you can imagine, the focus is also going to be on China, which made a decision to double down on Kim Jong-il, a decision you could argue has actually enabled bad behaviour. My best guess is that there's going to have to be some kind of strike on the artillery positions that are directly responsible for the shelling of the island and I wouldn't be surprised to see a missile strike or air attack on these facilities. Anything that goes beyond that however could be perceived to be a South Korean provocation. It's a very difficult balance made all the more difficult by the fact that the North Koreans are pretty expert at brinksmanship. They've also already made clear that if South Korea crosses the

Northern Limit Line by one-one hundredth of a millimetre, that they'll respond with all powers of thunder and lightning to destroy South Korea.

You talked there about China, and both the US over the weekend and now Australia have said they hope China will put some pressure on North Korea. Do you expect this to happen and how much leverage do the Chinese have?

Again, while the North Korean artillery barrage is a very serious action which in and of itself merits a robust response, the Yeonpyeong attack is also possibly a diversionary tactic which could complicate important efforts to generate a co-ordinated international response to recent revelations regarding North Korea's uranium enrichment programme. So primary attention and pressure must be directed at China, which can be seen as an enabler of such North Korean behaviour.

In refusing to hold North Korea accountable for the Cheonan incident, China tacitly encourages provocations such as the Yeonpyeong attack and the development of a uranium enrichment programme. Rather than waste time on a new UNSC Resolution, the US and its allies should work to make it immediately clear that the uranium enrichment programme is a direct violation of existing UNSCR 1874 and pressure Russia and China to vigorously implement this and other already existing resolutions.

Likewise, there needs to be clear and unanimous condemnation of this most recent provocation by the Security Council. Beijing made a decision to double down on its bet on its ability to moderate North Korean behaviour when it decided to host Kim Jong-il not once, but twice—even in the shadow of the Cheonan tragedy. As such, the onus to explain and respond to this most recent North Korean provocation is primarily upon China.

That said, there remains some question as to how much influence China has in Pyongyang. Up until the attack on Yeonpyeong, they were being lauded for moderating North Korean behaviour following the Cheonan incident. China's decision to support UNSCR 1874 is considered to be at least partially responsible for North Korea's hesitance to launch another long-range missile or to conduct another nuclear test. However, with this week's provocations, the limits of Beijing's influence have been exposed and the key question is now how China will respond.

You also talked about the revealing of the enrichment programme reported over the weekend. Did this take the US by surprise and why were US observers allowed in now?

The public revealing of North Korea's uranium enrichment programme was certainly far more of a surprise in Beijing and Moscow than it was in Washington. The US Government has been warning of North Korea's uranium enrichment programme and related procurement activities for over eight years, and even in the months and weeks leading up to this weekend's dramatic revealing of an apparently fully operational enrichment facility at Yongbyon complete with six cascades and approximately 2000

centrifuges, US officials have been raising the issue with their counterparts in China and Russia.

On April 15, 2009, North Korea officially declared its intent to develop its own Light Water Nuclear Reactor programme and is now likely hoping that the uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon will be seen as a peaceful facility intended to produce fuel for the small 30MW LWR currently under construction. However, not only is any type of enrichment programme a clear and obvious violation of the September 2005 joint statement of the Six-Party Talks, but it's also a clear violation of UNSCR 1874, which 'decides that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities.'

CSIS

Uranium and Artillery: North Korean Revelations and Provocations

By Victor Cha, Kathleen Harrington

November 24, 2010

On November 12, nuclear scientist Siegfried Hecker and his Stanford University colleagues John Lewis and Robert Carlin were taken on a tour of the recently updated Yongbyon Nuclear Complex in North Korea. They were shown an under-construction experimental light-water reactor (LWR), as well as an entirely new facility housing 2,000 centrifuges, machines intended to enrich uranium for the new reactor. Hecker and his colleagues expressed surprise at the sophistication and cleanliness of the new plant, characteristics that were not previously attributed to Yongbyon. After he returned from his trip, Hecker privately informed the White House of these new revelations regarding the North's nuclear program, which the administration had suspected was continuing despite UN sanctions. Following Hecker's revelations, North Korea fired scores of artillery rounds on November 23 near Yeonpyeong Island along the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea. Two South Korean marines and two civilians were killed in the clash, and the island's 1,600 residents were partially evacuated.

Q1: What is the purpose of the new facility at Yongbyon?

A1: The North Koreans claim they are building an experimental LWR with strictly domestic resources and talent set to be operational by 2012. They claim that the new centrifuge facility's intention is only to promote civilian nuclear power and not to enrich weapons grade uranium. However, there is little confidence that North Korea's intentions are purely energy oriented given its past history. Various experts on North Korea are predicting another nuclear test in the near future, and this new facility and reactor may be the means to that end.

Q2: Why would the North Koreans boast about their developing nuclear program?

A2: The further development of the North's nuclear program is a flagrant violation of UN sanctions against the country, which makes its unveiling to these U.S. scientists and experts seem like a bad idea to any reasonable person. However, from the perspective of the North Koreans, there could be several reasonable motivations for this, which include to push for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, from which the North hopes to receive substantial aid;
to strengthen the credentials of the heir apparent, Kim Jong-un, to support the delicate succession process that seems to be underway;
to solidify the North's nuclear weapons threat to be used as leverage in future negotiations.

Q3: What were the first signs that North Korea may have been enriching uranium?

A3: In 2002, the Bush administration confronted North Korea about its attempts to import materials necessary to build centrifuges. In 2008, the North Koreans, motivated by disarmament negotiations, relinquished 18,000 pages of Yongbyon's operating records to the U.S. State Department that were contaminated with uranium particles. Despite these indicators, many claimed the United States was undercutting negotiations with the North

on faulty pretenses. The revelations about the North's uranium-enrichment program have not only validated U.S. policy at the time, but also proved that the extent of the program is far more advanced.

Q4: What impact does the revelation of North Korea's new uranium-enrichment facility have on the potential resumption of the Six-Party Talks?

A4: Though the North Koreans may have hoped this revelation of their nuclear program would pressure the other five parties back to the negotiating table, the U.S. administration has announced that it would only "negotiate with North Korea if it demonstrates that it is serious about honoring its commitments by taking concrete and irreversible steps towards denuclearization." Therefore, this new activity at Yongbyon, before the border clash, would have most likely further stalled any official negotiations. However, U.S. officials have since asserted that today's attack near Yeonpyeong has effectively quelled any attempt to restart the Six-Party Talks.

Q5: What are the facts about today's border clash near the NLL?

A5: At 2:34 p.m. local time on November 23, North Korean artillery shells began falling in the waters surrounding Yeonpyeong Island. Approximately 50 shells hit a South Korean military base on the island, killing two South Korean marines, two civilians, and injuring 19 others. The barrage lasted about an hour according to a local government official, severely damaging many buildings on the island. The South Korean military fired approximately 80 shells and deployed several fighter jets to the area in retaliation. Before the incident, the South Korean military had been holding routine exercises off the Yeonpyeong coast. The United States, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have strongly condemned the North Korean attack, but China has only spoken out to urge all parties to exercise restraint. North Korea, of course, denies it instigated the clash and places all blame on the South.

Q6: What is North Korea's motivation for attacking the South this time?

A6: See Answer 2, above. In addition, it seems North Korea did not get the reaction it was hoping for from the regional actors in response to the revelations of its nuclear program. The United States and South Korea reaffirmed their stance not to resume the Six-Party Talks until the North demonstrates it is taking "concrete and irreversible steps towards denuclearization."

Q7: Can we expect more North Korean attacks in the near future?

A7: We cannot rule out the possibility of more attacks and provocations from the North given its recent belligerent behavior. The time between North Korean provocations seems to be shrinking significantly with each new incident. This could reflect growing instability in the North, the succession process, or a combination of both. The South Korean and U.S. militaries will hold joint exercises this coming week, which were planned prior to Tuesday's attack. North Korea may use the exercises as pretext for another attack.

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DPRK Foreign Ministry
Statement Released by Spokesman of DPRK Foreign Ministry
November 24, 2010
Pyongyang, DPRK

Pyongyang, November 24 (KCNA) -- A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry Wednesday issued the following statement:

As already reported by the Supreme Command of the KPA, the revolutionary armed forces of the DPRK on Nov. 23 took a decisive self-defensive measure to cope with the enemy's reckless military provocation of firing shells inside the territorial waters of the DPRK side around Yonphyong Islet in the West Sea of Korea.

The army of the DPRK warned several times that if even a single shell of the enemy is fired inside the territorial waters of the DPRK, it will take a prompt retaliatory strike in connection with the live shell firing drill they planned to stage from Yonphyong Islet while conducting the ill-famed war maneuvers for a war of aggression against the DPRK codenamed Hoguk.

At 8:00 a.m. on Nov. 23, the very day the incident occurred, the head of the delegation of the DPRK side to the inter-Korean military talks sent a telephone message to the head of the delegation of the enemy side once again strongly urging it to cancel the plan for staging the above-said firing drill in the waters around the islet, the sensitive waters. This notwithstanding, the enemy committed such an extremely reckless military provocation as firing dozens of shells from the islet inside the territorial waters of the DPRK side from around 13:00.

The enemy fired shells from the islet which is so close to the territory of the DPRK that it is within each other's eyeshot despite the fact that there are so many mountains and rivers, sea waters and islets in south Korea. This powder-reeking saber-rattling cannot be construed otherwise than a politically motivated provocation.

The enemy is claiming that they fired shells southward from the islet in a bid not to get on the nerves of the DPRK but Yonphyong Islet is located deep inside the territorial waters of the DPRK away from the maritime military demarcation line. If live shells are fired from the islet, they are bound to drop inside the territorial waters of the DPRK side no matter in which direction they are fired because of such geographical features.

The ulterior aim sought by the enemy is to create the impression that the DPRK side recognized the waters off the islet as their "territorial waters", in case that there was no physical counter-action on the part of the former.

Herein lies the crafty and vicious nature of the enemy's provocation.

The army of the DPRK took such a self-defensive measure as making a prompt powerful strike at the artillery positions from which the enemy fired the shells as it does not make an empty talk.

This incident is one more dangerous development which took place because of the illegal "northern limit line" unilaterally fixed by Clark, UN forces commander, as he pleased on Aug. 30, 1953 after the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

The U.S., its followers and some bosses of international bodies should drop such bad habit as thoughtlessly accusing somebody before learning about the truth about the incident.

If they shield South Korea, the criminal, without principle, just for being their ally, this is little short of feeding oil to the fire.

The DPRK that sets store by the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula is now exercising superhuman self-control but the artillery pieces of the army of the DPRK, the defender of justice, remain ready to fire.

North Korea's Dangerous Escalation
By The Diplomat
November 24, 2010

The Diplomat talks to Korea analyst L. Gordon Flake about this week's artillery exchange between North and South Korea.

The shelling by North Korea yesterday of the South Korean border island of Yeonpyeong is being described by many as one of the most serious incidents since the end of the Korean War. How much of an escalation would you say yesterday's exchange of fire marks?

It's a very serious escalation in what has been a series of provocations. The reason why people are more concerned about this than previous incidents such as ship-to-ship firing or firing out into the open ocean is because artillery shells were directed at an actual military base, resulting in South Korean service members being killed and, perhaps most troubling, civilians being killed. The images that one sees now of burning houses and an island with plumes of smoke rising skyward are alarming to say the least.

In a broader context, of course North Korea disputes the Northern Limit Line, and this dispute could be viewed as an inter-Korean clash. But this is a line that has been in existence for 60 years and South Korea has undertaken military exercises on a very regular basis. So there was clearly a decision on the part of North of Korea to escalate the situation in an extremely troubling way.

I'd also point out a very important contrast between this and what happened with the Cheonan in March. When the Cheonan was sunk, it was done at night and in stormy weather—there was a lot of ambiguity about what had happened and who had done it. As a result, I think the government in South Korea showed a remarkable degree of forbearance in conducting a methodical and international investigation before moving forward, and even then moving forward in a very careful way.

This time, I don't think President Lee Myung-bak and his administration have that same luxury in that there's no question about where the artillery shells came from, there's no question in terms of the impact on the lives of those living on the island and the fact that you now have refugees from the immediate damage. And so there's going to be tremendous demand for a rather immediate physical response. The challenge, of course, is that they are faced with a North Korea that has threatened an immediate escalation, and so it's difficult to know how to respond to the damage done to your country and the lives lost and yet not be precipitous.

Is there any indication at all as to why North Korea chose this moment to escalate? Could the succession issue have played any part?

It's always a dangerous thing to try and put yourself in North Korea's shoes to try and explain their behaviour. I'm always aware of the fact that there's an ongoing dialogue on an inter-Korean basis that we're not always privy to. So on one level, this is an inter-

Korean issue on a long-standing dispute and the North Koreans will, and already have, argued that this was an exercise that was firing into North Korean waters.

But the fact is that this was a South Korean military exercise like the ones conducted in August and September; there was firing by the South Korean military, but into the open ocean. North Korea itself has had periods where it has fired into the open ocean as well and warned ships to stay out of the area. But that is a very different thing from targeting a specific base and places of residence. So that's why this is considered so much of an escalation.

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What options does South Korea realistically have to respond?

The challenge is this: South Korea needs to respond in a manner that makes clear the gravity of North Korea's actions and to ensure there's some type of deterrent effect in the response. It could be argued that the failure to do that in response to the sinking of the Cheonan in the spring essentially encouraged this further provocation. And, as you can imagine, the focus is also going to be on China, which made a decision to double down on Kim Jong-il, a decision you could argue has actually enabled bad behaviour. My best guess is that there's going to have to be some kind of strike on the artillery positions that are directly responsible for the shelling of the island and I wouldn't be surprised to see a missile strike or air attack on these facilities. Anything that goes beyond that however could be perceived to be a South Korean provocation. It's a very difficult balance made all the more difficult by the fact that the North Koreans are pretty expert at brinksmanship. They've also already made clear that if South Korea crosses the

Northern Limit Line by one-one hundredth of a millimetre, that they'll respond with all powers of thunder and lightning to destroy South Korea.

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In refusing to hold North Korea accountable for the Cheonan incident, China tacitly encourages provocations such as the Yeonpyeong attack and the development of a uranium enrichment programme. Rather than waste time on a new UNSC Resolution, the US and its allies should work to make it immediately clear that the uranium enrichment programme is a direct violation of existing UNSCR 1874 and pressure Russia and China to vigorously implement this and other already existing resolutions.

Likewise, there needs to be clear and unanimous condemnation of this most recent provocation by the Security Council. Beijing made a decision to double down on its bet on its ability to moderate North Korean behaviour when it decided to host Kim Jong-il not once, but twice—even in the shadow of the Cheonan tragedy. As such, the onus to explain and respond to this most recent North Korean provocation is primarily upon China.

That said, there remains some question as to how much influence China has in Pyongyang. Up until the attack on Yeonpyeong, they were being lauded for moderating North Korean behaviour following the Cheonan incident. China's decision to support UNSCR 1874 is considered to be at least partially responsible for North Korea's hesitance to launch another long-range missile or to conduct another nuclear test. However, with this week's provocations, the limits of Beijing's influence have been exposed and the key question is now how China will respond.

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centrifuges, US officials have been raising the issue with their counterparts in China and Russia.

On April 15, 2009, North Korea officially declared its intent to develop its own Light Water Nuclear Reactor programme and is now likely hoping that the uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon will be seen as a peaceful facility intended to produce fuel for the small 30MW LWR currently under construction. However, not only is any type of enrichment programme a clear and obvious violation of the September 2005 joint statement of the Six-Party Talks, but it's also a clear violation of UNSCR 1874, which 'decides that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities.'

Special Representative for North Korea Policy
Stephen W. Bosworth
November 24, 2010
Beijing, China

The United States stands in solidarity with our South Korean allies and the international community in condemnation of North Korea's artillery attack against the island of Yeongpyong on November 23. The United States calls upon the DPRK to cease its provocative and irresponsible actions against its neighbors, fully abide by the terms of the Armistice, and adhere to its international obligations.

We call on all members of the international community to condemn the DPRK's acts and to make clear that they expect the DPRK to cease all provocations and implement its denuclearization commitments.

We offer our sincere condolences to the South Korean people, particularly the victims and their families.

The United States remains firmly committed to the defense of the Republic of Korea and to the maintenance of peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

North Korea manufactured this crisis
By Andrei Lankov at Kookmin University
November 24, 2010

(CNN) -- Yesterday afternoon, the worst artillery attack since the end of the Korean War happened in the vicinity of Seoul. North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing two civilians and two marines, and destroying a number of buildings there.

Is this attack just another sign of Pyongyang's alleged "irrationality?" Not really. As a matter of fact, the North Korean leaders might be brutal and ruthless, but they are very rational, and always know what they are doing (and normally get what they want.)

This time, North Korean leaders merely reminded Seoul that they are capable of making a lot of trouble if their demands are ignored.

A week earlier, a similar message was delivered to Washington, albeit in a less violent manner: A group of visiting American nuclear scientists was shown a state-of-the-art uranium enrichment plant.

This is a reaction to the current U.S. policy which is known as a "strategic patience," and to somewhat similar approach of Seoul.

This policy came to dominate Washington's thinking after the second nuclear test in May 2009 which demonstrated that North Korea had not the slightest intention to surrender its nuclear program (but, perhaps would not mind freezing it at its current level if payment was good.)

In essence, the "strategic patience" policy implies that the U.S. will not provide any concessions until North Korea demonstrates its "sincere willingness" to denuclearize -- something which is not going to happen, actually.

The right-leaning government of South Korea has adopted the same approach. It decided not to increase the amount of unilateral and unconditional aid to the North -- which has grown dramatically under the earlier leftist-nationalist administrations -- unless North Korea makes some concessions, too.

Washington and Seoul expected that sooner or later the international sanctions will start making an impact on North Korea, so it will have to accept their demands and become a bit more reciprocal. Otherwise, they were in no hurry to deal with Pyongyang.

However, Pyongyang leaders have grown quite impatient with "strategic patience."

Sometimes this is explained as a testimony that sanctions are beginning to bite, but this seems to be a wishful thinking: If anything, the food situation in North Korea is better than it has ever been in the last 16 years (albeit still bad by the standards of the modern

world), and the North Korean military is not short of money, as their new and shiny uranium enrichment facility demonstrated.

Nonetheless, it appears that North Korea would like to squeeze more aid from Washington and Seoul largely because they do not want to be too dependent on China which now is the nearly sole provider of aid.

So, North Korean strategists chose to hit the weakest spots of both major donors. Americans worry about proliferation, so they were shown that Pyongyang's nuclear program is advancing fast.

The South Koreans have a different vulnerability. Their efficient but outward-oriented economy depends on the whim of the international markets. Incidents like Yeonpyeong Island shelling are likely to scare markets, which damages the economy, and voters are likely to eventually blame the government for this damage.

The South Korean voters are remarkably indifferent to North Korea, but they are not going to be happy about economic troubles, so a government must know how to keep North Korean regime reasonable or face problems during the elections.

It is often stated that the incident has a lot to do with the succession issue in Pyongyang. Perhaps, the unusually violent nature of shelling is indeed related to North Korea's domestic policy. Kim Jong Eun, recently promoted to four-star general, needs the support of the old generals (real ones,) so this might be his way to show himself as a tough warlord, not a spoilt brat who spent his youth in Swiss schools.

However, this is not the major reason: The succession politics might have made the incident more violent than it would be otherwise. But something like this was bound to happen.

This fits well into North Korean established pattern of actions. When Pyongyang believes that more aid and concessions can be extracted, it first manufactures a crisis and then, when tensions are sufficiently high, suggests talks in order to get paid for returning to less dangerous behavior.

Will the crisis lead to a war or prolonged confrontation? Most certainly, not, and North Koreans know it. Neither the U.S. or South Korea are going to start a war. They will win, but the price - especially for Seoul -- will be prohibitively high.

Surgical strikes against military installations will not help, either. The lives of common North Korean soldiers are expendable, and their death will have no impact on Pyongyang's policy.

So, it seems that South Koreans will bite the bullet and, after a healthy portion of the face-saving rhetoric, return to the business of usual.

But it is also likely that in few months time the North Koreans will repeat the lesson. They want to show that "strategic patience" is not an option in the long run, and they seem to be right.

Statement of expression of concern over tensions on the Korean Peninsula
By Rev. Dr Olav Fykse Tveit, WCC general secretary
November 24, 2010

It is with great concern that we received the news about the escalation of tensions on the Korean peninsula. Yesterday's use of artillery and reports of casualties on Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow Sea are especially serious examples of incidents that stretch back to 1953 when the Korean War ended, without a ceasefire.

During the past several decades, the World Council of Churches has been engaged in peace and reconciliation efforts on the Korean peninsula. The World Council of Churches' unequivocal position has been that the use of force and military power will not resolve the problems that deprive the Korean people's aspiration for peace and reconciliation. The recent violent incidents also demonstrate once again how the unresolved divisions between the two Korean states pose a serious threat to peace and stability in the region. The whole people of the Korean Peninsula deserve a common future with justice and peace.

In the interests of people in both countries and their neighbours in Northeast Asia, the World Council of Churches urges the authorities in both North and South Korea to refrain from actions that exacerbate the tensions. We pray for God to protect all who live under threat and sporadic violence and all who yearn for peace and good relations between neighbours. We call for the governments of North and South Korea to demonstrate the genuine will to return to peace negotiations that will lead to peaceful co-existence and mutual respect, and to engage in a new process of confidence-building measures at the earliest possible date.

Rev. Dr Olav Fykse Tveit
WCC general secretary

Statement on North Korea's Artillery Attack Against South Korean Island
By Congressman Rick Larsen
November 23, 2010

Washington, D.C. — Today, U.S. Representative Rick Larsen (WA-02), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, released the following statement on North Korea's artillery attack against the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong.

“North Korea's unprovoked artillery attack onto the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong is unacceptable, belligerent behavior.

“The international community should not reward North Korea for its provocative actions.

“I am pleased that the United States is standing with South Korea, our treaty ally, during this difficult time. I urge the international community to join the United States in condemning North Korea's unprovoked aggression and supporting South Korea as we work to restore peace and stability to the region.”

The White House, For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
November 23, 2010
Washington DC, USA

Statement by the Press Secretary on North Korean Shelling of South Korean Island
Earlier today North Korea conducted an artillery attack against the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong. We are in close and continuing contact with our Korean allies. The United States strongly condemns this attack and calls on North Korea to halt its belligerent action and to fully abide by the terms of the Armistice Agreement. The United States is firmly committed to the defense of our ally, the Republic of Korea, and to the maintenance of regional peace and stability.

EU (MEMO/10/607)

Statement by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

Catherine Ashton

November 23, 2010

Brussels, Belgium

Statement by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton on North Korean attack on South Korean Island

Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission made the following statement:

"I am deeply concerned by today's events on the Korean Peninsula, which have reportedly led to casualties among South Korean military and civilians.

I strongly condemn this attack by the DPRK. I call on the North Korean authorities to refrain from any action that risks further escalation and to fully respect the Korean Armistice Agreement.

I welcome a call for restraint by President Lee Myung-bak.

We are monitoring developments closely. I would like to underline that peace and stability on the Korean peninsula remains essential for the region and the wider world."

Gyung-Lan Jung and 27 South Korean Women's Organizations
27 South Korean Women's Organizations' Statement on North Korea's Artillery
Barrage on Yeongpyeong Island
November 23, 2010

27 South Korean Women's Organizations' Statement on North Korea's Artillery Barrage
on Yeongpyeong Island
November 23, 2010

Under no circumstances can war be tolerated.
Armed conflict must be stopped and dialogue started!

On November 23rd, we received shocking news on the outbreak of a localized skirmish after North Korean forces launched an artillery barrage against the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong from a coastal artillery base in the Yellow Sea followed by a round of return fire from the South. During this exchange, two South Korean marines were killed and approximately 10 or more were injured including the residents of Yeonpyeong.

Even though this conflict region of the five islands near the Northern Limit Line has seen inter-Korean military clashes since the end of the Korean War, there is no precedent of a direct bombardment from North Korea on South Korean territory. Considering the civilian injuries and the damage done to homes, this is the most serious armed conflict since the Korean War.

We women are gravely concerned with today's incident which has ignited the 'war of words' into a reality of 'localized warfare.' This incident is an extreme demonstration of what tragic results the deterioration of inter-Korean relations and a rupture of dialogue can bring about. We cannot refrain from fearing that the slightest provocation could escalate this situation into the reality of war. Expressing our deepest condolences and sympathies to the innocent victims of Yeongpyeong and the Korean marines, we genuinely hope that the inter-Korean confrontation will not generate anymore victims.

The attack on Yeongpyeong, an area with civilian residents, by North Korea in response to South Korea's military exercise is rightfully deserving of censure. Violating security rules of civilians that are followed even in times of war is by no means tolerable. Meanwhile, our government's negligence of the deteriorating inter-Korean relations cannot help but be noticed. Inter-Korean relations must be fully re-examined and improved.

We are currently standing at a critical crossroads of either a repetition/expansion of this 'local war' on the Korean peninsula or finding a fundamental resolution to this conflict. In these extraordinary circumstances, we yearn deeply for a solution to the military tension between the two Koreas and strongly press the government of both Koreas with the following demands.

First, we insist on the halt of all armed clashes lest the situation becomes further

aggravated, and we demand that the two Koreas immediately enter into dialogue with each other. This year commemorates the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. We have already experienced the tragic lose-lose history of one people induced by military confrontation and war. Military tension between North and South Korea will not help anyone. We must manage this crisis peacefully through various channels and demand the immediate resumption of dialogue to find a solution to the fundamental cause of such conflicts.

Second, we must find solutions to the issues of contention surrounding the Northern Limit Line. Repetition of outbreaks of armed conflict in the Yellow Sea between the two Koreas can be likened to that of a warehouse of explosives. In the October 4th Declaration (2007), North and South Korea previously agreed to designate the Yellow Sea region as a 'special peace and cooperation zone' for the pursuit of mutual benefits. Upholding the draft of the North-South agreement, we demand for a fundamental resolution to the Yellow Sea dispute.

Third, we strongly desire inter-Korean relations that will plant hope in the citizens. The Yeongpyeong incident has aggravated the anxiety of citizens and is also inflicting great damage on the economy. We hope that inter-Korean relations do not deteriorate further and that the localized skirmish does not reoccur. In order to prevent another dispute from reoccurring, we demand the establishment of a ground-breaking and active measure to address the fundamental cause of this conflict to transfer the armistice of the Korean peninsula to a peace agreement.

This year marks 60 years since the outbreak of the Korean War. We women anticipate that the governments of both Koreas will seek to give hope to the citizens of the Korean peninsula as well as the people of the world through reconciliation, cooperation and reunification rather than military confrontation and calumny. Today, we are observing, with a fearful heart, a miserable reality where civilians are being victimized through reciprocated attacks by North and South Korea. Again, we strongly urge the authorities of North and South Korea to, without delay, enter into dialogue; and we press for the attainment of peace on the Korean peninsula through peaceful methods, bestowing hope in the hearts of citizens.

Women Making Peace

Kyunggi Women's Association United,
Gwangju-Jonnam Women's Association United,
Daegu-Kyungbuk Women's Association United,
Busan Women's Association United,
Kyungnam Women's Association
Korean Association of Christian Women for Women Minjung
Daegu Women's Association
Daejun Women's Association
Busan Counseling Center Against Sexual Violence
The Korean Catholic Women's Community for a New World
Suwon Women's Association

Ulsan Women's Association
Jeju Women's Association
Jeju Women's Human Rights Solidarity
Chungbuk Women's Association
Pohang Women's Association
Korea Sexual Violence Relief Center
Korea Women Workers Association
Korea Women's Associations United
Korean Womenlink
Korea Women's Studies Institute
Korea Women's Hotline
Korea Women Migrants' Human Rights Center
National Solidarity for the Solution for Sexual Trafficking
The National Association of Parents for Charm/education
Women' Social Education Center

UN

**Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on the
Korean Peninsula
November 23, 2010**

New York, 23 November 2010 - Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on the Korean Peninsula

The Secretary-General is deeply concerned by the escalation of tension on the Korean peninsula caused by today's artillery attack by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the Yeonpyeong Island. The attack was one of the gravest incidents since the end of the Korean War.

The Secretary-General condemns the attack and calls for immediate restraint. The Secretary-General regrets the loss of life and expresses sympathy to the victims and their families.

The Secretary-General insists that any differences should be resolved by peaceful means and dialogue.

The Secretary-General has conveyed his utmost concern to the President of the Security Council.

Ros-Lehtinen Statement on North Korean Aggression
November 23, 2010

(WASHINGTON) – U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, issued the following statement today regarding North Korea's military attack on a South Korean island which resulted in at least two deaths:

“This unprovoked attack by North Korea against its democratic neighbor is but the latest example of Pyongyang's increasingly aggressive posture. It comes on the heels of news reports about clandestine nuclear activities by the North Korean regime and a United Nations report of North Korean proliferation to other pariah states such as Iran, Syria, and Burma. Considered together, it is even more obvious that North Korea poses a serious threat to U.S. security interests and allies in the region.

“As with the attack earlier this year on the South Korean warship Cheonan, the United States must stand firmly with our steadfast ally South Korea during this crisis.

“As North Korea has ratcheted up its aggression over the past two years, I am concerned that the U.S. response has been too weak. This may have led Pyongyang to calculate that it can get away with even more. The U.S. must move to immediately re-list North Korea as a state-sponsor of terrorism and call on all responsible nations to adopt tough new sanctions on the North Korea regime.

“China, which wields significant influence over North Korea, must stop enabling the regime and join responsible nations in sending an unequivocal message to Pyongyang: abandon your aggressive agenda now.”

Berman Condemns North Korea's Attack on South Korea, Nuclear Activities November 23, 2010

Washington, DC – Rep. Howard L. Berman (D-CA), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, today expressed deep concern over North Korea's aggression against South Korea.

“Today's artillery attack by North Korea is a grave threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang should cease immediately its aggressive actions. I would also like to express my sympathy to the South Korean people for the loss of life and destruction of property as a result of the North's attack.

“North Korea's hostility seriously undermines regional peace and stability. I especially urge China to play a more active role in persuading North Korea to stop its belligerence; a destabilized Korean Peninsula is in no one's interest – least of all China, North Korea's nearest neighbor and ally. China should immediately suspend economic and energy assistance to show Pyongyang that its aggression has consequences.

“This is just the latest in a long line of outrageous provocations by North Korea. This weekend's revelations about a new, operational uranium enrichment plant is among the most worrisome, as it will enable North Korea to again expand its nuclear arsenal.

“We have known for some time that North Korea has been pursuing a uranium enrichment capability, and was assisted in this effort by A.Q. Khan's network. It is not clear if Pyongyang also received assistance from other international sources, and if such outside support continues to the present day.

“These revelations about the North Korean enrichment facility, taken together with Iran's similar enrichment program, underscore the urgent need for the international community to impose strict new regulations on the trade in uranium enrichment equipment and other sensitive technologies that can be used to make nuclear weapons. A useful place to begin would be for all international suppliers of civil nuclear equipment to require that all recipients forswear the acquisition of any new national uranium enrichment or reprocessing facility or activities as a condition of supply.”

Brownback Condemns North Korea's Attacks on South Korean Island of Yeonpyeong
November 23, 2010

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Sam Brownback today condemned North Korea for attacking the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong.

“North Korea has demonstrated once again that it is uninterested in peace or cooperation,” said Brownback. “China should be embarrassed that its policy with North Korea is allowing the East Asian region to become destabilized. China, North Korea’s benefactor, should stop providing financial and military assistance to North Korea, and instead assist the North Korean refugees flowing into China.”

North Korea today shelled Yeonpyeong, an island near the disputed border between North and South Korea which houses South Korean military installations and has a small civilian population. The two states then exchanged artillery fire. Two South Korean marines were killed; sixteen South Korean soldiers and three civilians were injured. Villagers’ homes have been burned and destroyed.

Brownback in the past has sponsored legislation to aid North Korean refugees as well as legislation that would put North Korea back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
Senate Passes Webb Resolution Condemning North Korean Attack

**Boehner Statement on North Korea's Hostile Action Against South Korea
November 23, 2010**

Speaker-designate John Boehner (R-OH) issued the following statement responding to North Korea's artillery attack on a South Korean island:

"North Korea is an unstable, aggressive regime, and I join the President in condemning its hostile action today. We will stand by South Korea and are firmly committed to defending our ally. Recent news reports suggest that North Korea may be developing an enriched uranium program, which could give it a second path toward having nuclear weapons it can use to threaten peaceful nations. Coupled with North Korea's pursuit of a ballistic missile capability, it's clear we must get serious about our homeland missile defense capabilities, as Republicans promised to do in our Pledge to America."